

PLURALISM WORKING PAPER | 2009 / NO 3

# **INSTRUMENTS FOR PROMOTING PLURALISM**

**Examples from two Indonesian NGOs**

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## Colophon

First published in December 2009 by the Promoting Pluralism Knowledge Programme, jointly coordinated by:

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Design by Tangerine – design communicatie advies, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

ISSN 1879-7172

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Author(s), 'Title', *Pluralism Working Paper series*. Paper no./year.

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# Instruments for Promoting Pluralism

**Examples from two Indonesian NGOs**

Farid Wajidi

Darmiyanti Muchtar

## Pluralism Working Paper no 3

Title	<b>Creating Cultural Bases for Public Reason Intercultural encounters in youth communities in Indonesia</b>
Author	Farid Wajidi
Keywords	Public reason, pluralism, NGO strategy, youth
Category in Working Paper series	C – Practice-based reflections
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Title	<b>Gauging Pluralism in Society KAPAL Perempuan's Experience with the Application of Community Based Assessment Card on Pluralism at the Village Level</b>
Author	Darmiyanti Muchtar
Keywords	Pluralism, Citizen Report Card, NGO strategy
Category in Working Paper series	C – Practice-based reflections
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Website	<a href="http://www.kapalperempuan.org">www.kapalperempuan.org</a>

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Welcome to the *Pluralism Working Paper series* for the Promoting Pluralism Knowledge Programme. The series provides a vehicle for early dissemination of knowledge and aims to reflect the broad range and diversity of theoretical and empirical work that is undertaken by academic researchers and civil society based development practitioners in association with the Promoting Pluralism Knowledge Programme.

The Promoting Pluralism Knowledge Programme (PPKP) is carried out in an international cooperative structure that includes the Humanist Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries (Hivos) and the Kosmopolis Institute of the University for Humanistics, both in the Netherlands, the Centre for the Study of Culture and Society (CSCS, Bangalore, India), the Center for Religious and Cross Cultural Studies (CRCS, Yogyakarta, Indonesia) and the Cross-Cultural Foundation of Uganda (CCFU, Uganda).

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On behalf of the international Promoting Pluralism Programme staff, we thank you for your interest in our working papers.

Caroline Suransky, Hilde van 't Klooster and Ute Seela

Editors of the *Pluralism Working Paper series*



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# Editor's preface

This working paper presents two interesting examples of 'practices of pluralism' in Indonesia. The authors work in the NGO sector and participate in the Regional Team of the Promoting Pluralism Knowledge program in Indonesia.

Both describe their engagement with the challenges they meet when trying to effectively promote pluralism in local communities.

Farid Wajidi is the Director of the Institute for Islamic and Social Studies (LKIS), based in Yogyakarta. In his paper, he suggests somewhat ironically that the pro-pluralism movement in Indonesia can learn a lot from the varied strategies that fundamentalist organizations adopt when they try to reach their target groups. By comparison, those in favor of pluralism tend to be too elitist and limit themselves to intellectual discussions. Their methods do not reach the general public, argues Wajidi. He proposes that new, more innovative and creative approaches should be considered. As an example, he describes the ways in which LKiS focuses on the youth by inviting high school students to *personally experience* pluralism instead of only *talking* about it.

Darmiyanti Muchtar is Executive Director of the Circle of Alternative Education for Women (KAPAL Perempuan), based in Jakarta. KAPAL Perempuan believes that community based assessment is a crucial element in advocacy work on pluralism at grass root level. Based on extensive research in local communities in Bali, Gorontalo and Kalimantan, they developed the so-called *assessment cards on pluralism*. This is a new instrument, designed to help communities map and reflect on their own local inter-group relations, with a special focus on social justice and gender equality. In her paper, Muchtar presents the first results of the work they have recently done in local villages. She ends her paper by identifying some of the possibilities and challenges she sees in working with this new instrument on pluralism.

Both papers give us good insights into the complexities of practicing pluralism in our daily lives.

Caroline Suransky

Chief editor of the *Pluralism Working Paper series* for the Promoting Pluralism Knowledge Programme



# Creating Cultural Bases for Public Reason

## *Intercultural encounters in youth communities in Indonesia*

**Farid Wajidi**

In this paper I would like to address new approaches and strategies in promoting pluralism that I have been focusing on as Director of The Institute for Islamic and Social Studies (LKiS). LKiS is a non-governmental organization, based in Yogyakarta Indonesia, that works on the development of transformative Islamic ideas and the promotion of pluralism, tolerance and democratic values. I will posit a discussion on new approaches and strategies within the local context in Indonesia and take a look at the ongoing efforts of LKiS to develop a culture of pluralism among the youth in Indonesia with the hope to create new cultural bases for public reason.

### **A tendency towards religious exclusivism in Indonesia**

Indonesia is home to many cultures, ethnicities, religions and beliefs. For a long time Indonesians believed that diversity - in terms of religion, culture and ethnicity - was a deep-rooted reality in a long history. However, during the last ten years many Indonesians have been shocked by the realisation that the social cohesion they have been so proud of for such a long time, may in fact be not as solid as previously imagined.

Although a generally harmonious tone to relations among people of different religious backgrounds remains present in Indonesia today, increasingly we witness a worrying tendency towards 'exclusivism' and religious fundamentalisms, primarily among Muslim groups, but also among other religious groups. Some Islamist groups, who previously aspired to a Shari'a-based state and failed, now work at the local level by introducing various Shari'a-oriented bylaws in a number of districts throughout the country. This development has narrowed possibilities in the public sphere for women, non-Muslim religious groups, and those Muslims who do not follow a strict interpretation of Islam. The abovementioned tendency also led a number of non-Muslim groups in certain districts to become more exclusivist. These developments seem to put the diversity as well as integrity of the nation at risk on the long run. We witness growing tensions between different social groups, and the emergence of new identity politics among religious groups. The cumulative effect of all these worrying developments signal a threat to pluralism in Indonesia.

## A need for new strategies for promoting pluralism

One indication of this tendency towards fundamentalism or 'exclusivism' among Muslims was a controversial fatwa issued by the MUI (the Council of Indonesian Ulama) which declared pluralism, liberalism and secularism as *haram* or religiously illegitimate.

It would be easy to point out the weaknesses and dismiss the arguments in favour of this fatwa, but its very existence is already a problem. For many Muslims this fatwa has fuelled a negative popular perception towards pluralism as a concept, which means that the space for pro-pluralism groups to promote their position has been restricted. For this reason, many activists prefer to use the term diversity, instead of pluralism. The question therefore is: *how can we continue to promote pluralism in a context where even the very word 'pluralism' is considered religiously illegitimate?*

This state of affairs forced many activists to adopt new strategies. These new strategies and approaches have become necessary given the current backdrop of Indonesia's campaign for pluralism. Presently, Indonesia's campaign for pluralism seems to suffer from two basic weaknesses. *Firstly*, the campaign tends to be elitist in the sense that only certain limited groups are involved. These groups mainly consist of intellectuals and religious scholars have dominated the scene. *Secondly*, and closely related to the first, there is a lack of imagination in the ways in which the values of pluralism and tolerance are promoted and disseminated. Pluralism advocates' tend to limit themselves to seminars and discussions, or newspaper articles, thus attracting only a certain audiences. The issues they focus on often seem irrelevant and not the real challenges which common people face. Their arguments are hard to understand for the general public and their approaches tend to be monotonous.

Bearing all this in mind, it is not surprising to note that the number of supporters of the pluralism campaign has not significantly increased, especially in comparison to support that fundamentalist positions have galvanized by campaigning for a literal and Shari`a-oriented understanding of Islam. They have moved into communities by using a variety of methods, like publishing simple leaflets and using popular media, in order to reach various kinds of audiences. In this way they have also reached children, teenagers, and housewives.

By presenting this simple comparison, I am implying that pluralist groups should learn selectively from the methods and approaches that have been employed by the Islamists to broaden their support base among common people. Here I would like to discuss an approach that *The Institute for Islamic and Social Studies* (LKiS) has been experimenting with for some time. We call it *experiencing pluralism* as opposed to talking about pluralism. It can be done even without mentioning the term.

## Experiencing Pluralism without talking about Pluralism

The idea for our new approach to promoting pluralism arose when we were trying to see what we could do among high school students. We observed that the various groups who promoted pluralism and democracy in Indonesia had been focusing too exclusively on adults, while teenagers or high school students were neglected. The idea that the pro pluralism movement can learn from its opponents is ironic since they themselves have been frequently a target of infiltration by various Muslim fundamentalist groups that promote 'exclusivist' religious views. Through various media and extra-curriculum activities organised by Islamist groups among University students - among others *Tarbiyah* and *Salafy* - many high school students in various cities have been indoctrinated with exclusive and intolerant social and religious views. As a result, the growth of a healthy relationship between students from different religious-ethnic-cultural backgrounds has been hampered, while the space that is available for genuine initiatives and creativity has been compromised. This situation presents a real serious problem in terms of its intensity as well as its scale.

LKiS has campaigned for pluralism for more than ten years. But we realized that our approaches would not be suitable for a specific teenage audience. So, at LKiS we decided to explore alternative approaches that were more responsive to a number of trends in youth culture and media, for sake of effectiveness as well as for avoiding unnecessary controversies. Finally we came up with the idea of creating a community of young creative writers. We started with organizing workshops on creative writing in which teenagers were enabled to develop their own practical skills in creative writing. As a follow up, workshop participants were then facilitated to publish a four-page biweekly bulletin, which was distributed to various high schools in Yogyakarta province. In addition, we also provided a location for them to relax, discuss interesting films and novels, or anything else of interest to the participants. Besides these initiatives, youth communities were given the opportunity to discuss

various issues relevant to their needs through periodical meetings organised by themselves. After some time LKiS also created a number of youth communities of documentary film makers, through a similar process.

All activities deal with writing and producing bulletins, and making documentary films on all issues that are of interest to the participants. What makes these kinds of programs relevant to the promotion of pluralism, is that we deliberately form groups of people of different religion, culture, ethnicity and gender. In this way we give the participants an opportunity to interact with each other and work together in creative activities. Throughout all these activities we create situations in which young participants will personally experience various kinds of plurality and we help them to develop a capacity to deal with related problems in the future.

## Repersonalising beliefs

The basic assumption behind these efforts is that: *if people have some real experience of meeting and working together with people from different religious-cultural backgrounds who are nice, then any kind of generalized prejudices, stereotyping or stigmatisation against people from those cultures or religions would no longer work.* We believe that the actual experience of pluralism at an individual level is something that cannot be implanted instantly. Rather it grows over time, through the processes of doubt, asking and answering questions, and raising new personal doubts again about ones own position and that of others. This is a concrete example of what I mean when I say that we need to learn selectively from the strategies of fundamentalist organisations. However, pluralism can not be promoted in exactly the same way because it needs a deeper process. What is different for instance, is that a kind of *critical reasoning* is needed in the processes.

By enabling people to meet and understand real-life religious others, we basically *repersonalise* the beliefs that people hold by founding them on real-life experiences, whereas the fundamentalists try to depersonalise their beliefs. I differentiate between fundamentalists and pluralists or between 'exclusivists' and 'inclusivists', according to their conviction about human agency in creating the truth, whatever it may be. Pluralists/inclusivists basically recognise that they take part in creating the truth(s) they struggle for. This refers to what I call 'public reason'. Public reason is a kind of critical reasoning that is 'inclusive' or 'plural' because it is open to all people regardless of their cultural, ethnic, religious or educational background. In the process of public reasoning it is recognized that there is no single 'truth': what is perceived as 'truth' is always a human interpretation. In processes of public reason, different views and human interpretations of reality, including holy texts, can be debated and are part of the creation of new truth(s). In contrast, fundamentalists/exclusivists believe that they follow and struggle for something written literally in the holy texts, without involving any human interpretation.

I want to add an observation which I find interesting: the video camera as an apparatus can be helpful for the purpose of making the user sensitive to the 'other'. With a video camera in hand, students tend to shoot something that appears odd from their perspective. So metaphorically speaking, they try to reach the objects that are most distant from themselves. Subsequently, when these objects are already in reach, there finally seems no choice but to let the objects speak for themselves.

So in this way, from the outset, students seem to want to break with the intercultural/inter-religious boundaries through their encounters with 'others'. There is a theory about intercultural first encounter that says that when we meet people or things from a different culture, religion, etc, for the first time, we do not see them as they are, but we see them as we are. This means we always see the other on the basis of an attitude we already have, including our prejudices. In such situations, students just need to take a few steps in order to transform themselves into becoming an 'inclusivist', in the sense that they will learn about a new personal truth about reality.

Such kinds of processes will help to create new cultural bases in Indonesian society where a kind of public reason can work. In the case of Indonesia, I think it may prove useful to make sure that these processes of public reasoning are not dominated by a certain elite. If we allow that to happen, I am afraid that the whole process of promoting pluralism will come to a halt at a simplified political and symbolic level.



# Gauging Pluralism in Society

## *KAPAL Perempuan's Experience with the Application of Community Based Assessment Cards on Pluralism at the Village Level*

Darmiyanti Muchtar

### Decentralization and Pluralism

Following the downfall of Suharto's regime, the political situation in Indonesia experienced a succession of dynamic changes. Democratization became a key word and as a result decentralization took on a more central role. Through decentralization, the division of power between the central and local governments was assured. Local governments in particular at the district level were conferred extensive autonomy to govern their own territories without interference from the central government, including in the formulation of local policies and regulations.

It has been more than 10 years since decentralization became an important part of Indonesia's political landscape. Alas, the outcome is still far below expectation. Good and clean governance has not been fully realized, civil society participation remains at a low level and the local population has yet to enjoy a decent living. Over the last 10 years, decentralization has also led to fundamental shifts in intergroup relations. In the period of the Suharto regime, intergroup relations were a sensitive issue that could not be disputed. It was covered under the slogan of *Bhineka Tunggal Eka* (Unity in Diversity). With this narrative it was intended to promote an overarching Indonesian culture, as the country's predominant culture built on its diverse local traditions and cultures. The narrative of a common Indonesian identity started to dominate primordial identities; religious and especially ethnic identities. The result was that religious-and ethnic-driven sentiments were suppressed during Suharto's rule. However, these sentiments were still alive amongst the native people. The process of economic development marginalized many indigenous people - not just from the economic process but also from decision making processes – and contributed to the increase of poverty. The indigenous people who became marginalized from the development process perceived non-native people as outsiders who enjoyed the fruits of development so far.

Decentralization subsequently opened up new opportunities for the emergence of previously marginalized primordial identities. The surfacing of these identities has induced strong ethnic and religious sentiments based on the perception of indigenous people who see themselves as being robbed of the chance to become the "host" of their own territories. Outsiders are perceived as a threat which in turn triggered an unmistakable chasm between the "outsiders" and "insiders" of society. Pluralism - which deals with power relations among groups in a society - faces formidable challenges due to this segmentation. Intergroup relations have become fragile and conflictual. Public policy tends to favor one particular group and discriminates against minority groups and women's groups.

In 2009, *KAPAL Perempuan*<sup>1</sup> conducted a study of 3 provinces with distinct characteristics; Bali where Hindu-Balinese people form the majority population, Gorontalo where the Muslim-Gorontalo ethnicity and religion predominate, and Central Kalimantan with Christian-Dayak being the major ethno-religious group. Research findings revealed that recognition, representation, and redistribution between the indigenous people and outsiders are crucial issues in all three provinces. Through

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<sup>1</sup> *KAPAL Perempuan* is a women's organization committed to issues of alternative education and pluralism. For more information about this organization see: [www.kapalperempuan.org](http://www.kapalperempuan.org)

decentralization, indigenous communities who have long been left behind in many sectors in their own land, are now given the space and opportunity to secure recognition, increase representation in the public sphere (including in formal politics) and attain greater access to economic processes. Within this context, the continued strengthening of identity politics – i.e., politics that fight for the legitimization and power of a particular group identity that is marginalized in discourses and in power relations within society – can no longer be avoided. Identity politics has evolved into an inextricable part of the “indigenous people’s” struggle in contending over sources of livelihood in their own home land. This for instance is reflected in the increasingly popular notion of “home-grown political leaders” who aspire for the supremacy of the indigenous people in formal politics.

Strengthening of identity politics at the local level frequently leads to ethnic- and religious-based conflict which continues to intensify in parallel with the strengthening of religious fundamentalist movements occurring at the national and global levels. The rise in fundamentalism has served as a foundation for identity politics movements that seek to ensure that ethnic- and religious-based identities dominate the public domain within a plural society, at both the national and local levels. Here lies the challenge for “civic pluralism”. At the national level, this is reflected in the *fatwas* (rulings) issued by the Indonesian *Ulema Council* (MUI) which proscribe pluralism and women’s leadership, and in the Anti-Pornography Act which restricts minority rights and criminalizes women. In the public arena where intergroup negotiations should be the norm, the situation has become untenable due to further restrictions on negotiation forums for minority and marginalized groups, including women.

Room for negotiation among members of a plural society becomes crucial considering the current situation in Indonesia. There is a strong tendency toward the adoption of Islamic Shari’a law as the foundation for policy making in regions. This tendency has become a critical threat for minority and marginalized groups as well as for women whose voices are ignored in these processes of public policy-making. This can be illustrated by the case of Aceh, which has recently issued a canon law that calls for death by stoning for adultery committed by married heterosexual people, eight-and-a-half years in prison and 100 lashes of the cane for premarital sex or homosexuality, 400 lashings for child rape, and 60 lashings for gambling. Similar policies have emerged throughout Indonesia in the past 10 years since the reform era. Dozens of Shari’a-based policies have been issued by many local governments across Indonesia. They regulate public dress code, public morality, and even the criteria for becoming a public leader which, as is the case in Aceh, include the mandatory requirement of being competent in reciting the Qur’an. Other examples can be found in West Nusa Tenggara. Here Shari’a-based policies regulate salary deductions applicable to government employees and teachers for the payment of *zakat* (obligatory alms); the obligation to recite the Qur’an for Muslim civil servants; who will receive their letter of appointment/job promotion; who is scheduled to hold an audience with the district head (brides and bridegrooms, junior and high school students, visitors); as well as the obligation to wear the headscarf for Muslim women.

Religious- and ethnic-based public policies that tend to be discriminatory toward minority groups and women have drawn widespread attention from the pro-democracy and women’s movement in Indonesia. Various reports have indicated that the field implementation of Shari’a-based public policies enacted in various regions across Indonesia has in fact further narrowed the much needed space for recognition, representation and redistribution of women’s groups, the marginalized and the poor<sup>2</sup>. Many policies that prioritize men’s leadership have been detrimental to the life of women in the domestic and public realms. Example are Gorontalo’s Bylaw No. 10/2003 Against Immoral Acts, which legitimizes the domestication of women, and customary and religious laws that have caused the withdrawal of the candidacy of a female politician running for district head. This shows that women are prohibited from becoming leaders.

It is indeed unfortunate that the appropriate data and analysis on the strengthening of religious-based identities and identity politics are severely limited despite the wealth of scientific and academic papers on the matter. Advocacy work on this particular issue also remains negligible and far removed from the actual situation of the people’s everyday existence. In fact, the general public instead often sees the issue of civic pluralism as a Western concept, a pointless issue with a lack of local context. Notwithstanding the fact that society is increasingly fearful of the prevalence of conflict, notably violent disputes sparked off by religious and ethnic sentiments have instead further compartmentalized society.

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<sup>2</sup> See reports by Komnas Perempuan, 2009; Jurnal Perempuan, 2009; KAPAL Perempuan, 2009; Musdah Mulia, 2007; KPI’s annual report, 2006.

## Community-Based Assessment Cards on Pluralism

Public analysis, particularly at the community level, of the pluralism situation has not been established. However, community-based assessment is a crucial element in building advocacy work on pluralism at the grass-roots level. Based on intensive research done in Bali, Gorontalo, and Central Kalimantan, *KAPAL Perempuan* has felt the need to develop community based assessment cards on pluralism. These cards are developed by *KAPAL Perempuan* based on the research findings in Bali, Gorontalo, and Central Kalimantan.

In a participatory manner *KAPAL Perempuan* designed community-based assessment cards on pluralism. The pluralism cards serve as an instrument that help a community to self-assess intergroup relations in their own community, to measure and detect potential conflict stemming from social segmentation and discriminatory policies against minority groups, the marginalized and women, and to measure the extent of ethnic- and religious-based identity strengthening in their immediate environment. This assessment tool can also help to gauge the extent to which identity strengthening has impact on public policy-making that may undermine pluralistic values, violate human rights and women's rights and incite ethnic- and religious-based violent conflicts. Through the pluralism cards therefore, a community will have the ability to detect as early as possible potential ethnic- and religious-based open conflict which may lead to violence and victimization. Assessment results are then used as the basis for generating recommendations that can be given to society, to religious and traditional leaders, and to local government. These recommendations should be acted upon by the community and the government in an effort to create a plural society that honors the principles of social justice and gender equality.

Through the pluralism cards, it is expected that society will have the capacity to ensure early detection of potential conflict and human rights violation while devising an effective strategy to build a plural society that upholds gender justice and social equality.

The Pluralism Cards consist of five separate cards:

CARD A, to assess ethnic- and religious-based *social disparity* that exists within a community in a particular area.

CARD B, to assess the presence or absence of ethnic- and religious-based *latent conflict* in a particular area.

CARD C, to assess the presence or absence of ethnic- and religious-based *open conflict* in a particular area.

CARD D, to assess the presence or absence of ethnic- and religious-based *identity strengthening* in a particular area.

CARD E, to assess the extent to which identity strengthening has encroached into *public policy-making* with the potential of undermining pluralistic values, violating human rights (notably economic, social and cultural rights) and creating ethnic- and religious- driven conflict.

The five CRCs are inter-related and are part of an assessment process aimed at producing a complete picture of the religious- and ethnic-based identity strengthening pattern in a particular community. The diagram below illustrates the link between the five CRCs and the assessment process involved.




Diagram 1: Mechanism and Linkages of the Community-Based Assessment Cards on Pluralism

All five cards listed above must be completed by members of the community in a participatory manner to ensure that assessment results are based on the views and opinions of the community. The process of filling in the pluralism cards must be supervised by a facilitator trained to conduct this activity. As it is participatory in nature, the method most appropriate for the implementation of the pluralism cards is the method of focus group discussions (FGDs). FGDs allow members of the community to be involved in the assessment process by providing information which is instantly verified, to engage in constructive discussions with other participants, and to arrive at a consensus in determining the concluding assessment.

To obtain comprehensive information and to ensure that the assessment represents the different views that exist within the community, FGDs are organized for four different groups:

*Heterogeneous group* consisting of diverse ethnic groups and religions as well as positions within a community;

*Homogenous group* originating from one ethnic group and or religion with the strengthening of its identity;

*Outsiders* coming from different ethnic groups and religions as well as professions;

*Women's group.*

Every FGD shall consist of 15 to 20 participants with 2 facilitators and 1 note taker who shall also act as observer. The facilitator in this assessment process on pluralism is responsible for (a) providing an explanation on CRC (b) facilitating the election of the assembly chair and the FGD note taker (c) assisting the FGD chair in carrying out discussions (d) making important notes (e) facilitating the formulation of recommendations from FGD participants after obtaining CRC results.

The FGDs will be conducted in a participatory manner if all assessments are carried out by participants themselves, with assistance from the facilitator. The chair of the discussion and the note taker can best be selected from among the participants. The chair person has the obligation to formally open and conclude the FGD and lead the sessions. The note taker shall record the entire process and present group results at the plenary forum. Assessment results will then be used as the basis for producing recommendations in response to pluralism issues that have the potential of creating discord and intergroup conflicts in society.

## How does the Community conduct the assessment process?

### CARD A: Assessing ethnic- and religious-based social disparity that exists within a community in a particular area

The assessment process begins with the involvement of each FGD group mentioned earlier in measuring social disparity based on ethnic group and religion that they themselves experience on a daily basis. Four aspects assessed in determining the extent of the social gap are: (a) tendency toward creating separate groupings between natives and outsiders based on ethnicity and religion; (b) intergroup interaction based on ethnicity and religion; (c) job and economic groupings undertaken by natives and outsiders; (d) residential groupings based on ethnicity and religion. All four aspects are assessed through Card A as provided below.

Matrix of Card A Assessment

Aspect	Question	SCORE		
		HIGH 7-10	MEDIUM 4-6	LOW 1-3
A. Tendency toward creating separate groupings between the natives and outsiders based on ethnicity and religion.	1. Are there community groups identified as natives and outsiders based on ethnicity and religion?	Yes and very distinct.	Yes but more accommodating groupings.	No
	2. What is the most important aspect in groupings based on ethnicity or religion or the combination of both?	Based purely on ethnicity or a combination of both religion and ethnicity.	Based on only religion.	-
	3. Is there any legitimacy to	Strong legitimacy	No sufficiently	-

	perpetuate and strengthen groupings based on ethnicity and religion (e.g. mentioned in customary laws, local history and others)?	from customary laws, local history and even formal policies.	strong legitimacy.	
<b>ASPECT A OVERALL SCORE</b>	1-9 : LOW 10-18 : MEDIUM 19-30 : HIGH			
B. Intergroup interaction based on ethnicity and religion	4. Is there any restriction imposed on interaction between natives and outsiders or among ethnic groups or among religious followers in your area? e.g.: prohibition to wish a follower of a different religion when the person is celebrating his/her holy festival.	Yes, with clear delineation on interaction among natives or among ethnic groups or among religious followers.	Yes but subtle	No
	5. Is there any customary/traditional/religious law that endorses restrictive interaction?	Yes, in the form of written laws/regulations/fatwa's	Yes but in the form of norms, traditions and unwritten agreements	-
<b>ASPECT B OVERALL SCORE</b>	1-6 : LOW 7-12 : MEDIUM 13-20 : HIGH			
C. Job and economic groupings undertaken by natives and outsiders	6. Is there any job or economic grouping undertaken by natives or outsiders?	Yes and very distinct.	Yes but less distinct groupings.	No.
	7. In which type of employment or economic sector are natives generally involved? How is the income?	Groupings mainly concentrate on low-skilled work and low income	Natives work in various economic sectors developed in their area.	Ability to inter-mingle well
	8. In which type of work or economic sector outsiders are generally employed in? How is the income?	Groupings mainly concentrate on the service sector and with decent income compared to the natives.	Outsiders work in various economic sectors developed in their area.	Ability to inter-mingle well
	9. Is there any income disparity between natives and outsiders?	A relatively wide income gap exists between natives and outsiders	Slightly narrower income disparity between natives and outsiders.	No income gap between natives and outsiders.
<b>ASPECT C OVERALL SCORE</b>	1-12 : LOW 13-24 : MEDIUM 25-40 : HIGH			

D. Residential groupings based on ethnicity and religion.	10. Is there any residential location in your area established based on ethnicity and religion?	Each group has their own settlement area.	Settlements are to some degree still based on ethnicity/ religion but not as many and local residents have begun to blend with each other.	No distinct separation of settlement areas where residents inter-mingle well with each other.
ASPECT D OVERALL SCORE	1-3 : LOW 4-6 : MEDIUM 7-10 : HIGH			

Once a score has been attached to each aspect, all scores are then tallied and the result is matched with the following assessment scale:

ASPECT	TOTAL		
	High	Medium	Low
A. Tendency toward creating separate groupings between the natives and outsiders based on ethnicity and religion.	19-30	10-18	1-9
B. Intergroup interaction based on ethnicity and religion.	13-20	7-12	1-6
C. Job and economic groupings undertaken by natives and outsiders.	25-40	13-24	1-12
D. Residential groupings based on ethnicity and religion.	7-10	4-6	1-3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>61-100</b>	<b>31-60</b>	<b>1-30</b>

*Meaning of Assessment*

- 1-30       Absence of social disparity between natives and outsiders. Intermingling among residents proceeds smoothly.
- 31-60     Social disparity still exists between natives and outsiders but moderately so. The intermingling among members of the community is still a gradual ongoing process.
- 61-100    Wide social disparity between natives and outsiders. Distinct segmentation both socially and economically between natives and outsiders.

When assessment results show that there exists no social gap between natives and outsiders, then there is no need to continue with the assessment. It is then assumed that pluralism is well established in the community. However, when social disparity in the community prevails, assessment shall proceed through Card B in order to determine whether this social gap will eventually lead to latent conflict.

**CARD B: Gauging Ethnic- and Religious-Based Latent Conflict**

Card B is used to measure the extent to which latent conflict based on ethnicity and religion occurs in a particular community. The five aspects assessed to measure this latent conflict are: (a) level of suspicion/dislike based on ethnicity and religion; (b) sense of security; (c) tangible form of the said suspicion/dislike; (d) forms of resistance that emerge as a reaction from natives or outsiders; (e) gender role in the latent conflict. All five aspects are measured through CARD B as explained below.

Matrix of Card B Assessment

Aspect	Question	SCORE		
		HIGH 7-10	MEDIUM 4-6	LOW 1-3
A. Level of suspicion/dislike based on ethnicity and religion shown by natives toward outsiders and vice versa.	1. Is there any feeling of dislike/prejudice/suspicion between natives and outsiders based on ethnicity and religion?	Yes and clear indications of suspicion between natives and outsiders or among ethnic groups or among religious believers	Mild indication	No.
	2. If yes, state the reason.	Reason cited focuses more on the mistake of outsiders or natives, or other ethnic groups and religion.	Reason cited is not focused on the mistakes made by those outside of their own grouping.	-
	3. When has this feeling of prejudice intensified?	Since regional autonomy	Since only the past 1 or 2 years	-
	4. At what level is the suspicion/dislike on the grounds of ethnicity and religion?	At the level of hatred.	Has not reached the level of hatred.	-
	5. Who are the actors/institutions that reinforce the feeling of dislike/prejudice/suspicion ?	Traditional and religious leaders and institutions, the government and the common people	Restricted to formal/informal prominent figures and leaders with vested interest.	-
	6. What is the implication of prejudice on the grounds of ethnicity and religion?	The feeling of insecurity and fear	The feeling of anxiety but not to the level of fear	-
<b>ASPECT A OVERALL SCORE</b>	1 – 18 : LOW 19 – 36 : MEDIUM 37 – 60 : HIGH			
B. Sense of security.	7. Is there a feeling of insecurity among natives and outsiders?	Profound feeling of insecurity which can be clearly defined.	Sense of insecurity is evident although not at an alarming level.	A general sense of security.
	8. Is the sense of insecurity related to diminishing economic sources as	Yes, very clear connection	Only related to rising crime rates	-

	<p>well as weakening political security and rising crime rates?</p> <p>9. At which level is this feeling of insecurity?</p> <p>10. Since when does this feeling exist?</p> <p>11. Who is responsible for its perpetuation?</p> <p>12. What is the implication of this sense of insecurity?</p>	<p>At the level of fear, trauma and paranoid.</p> <p>Since regional autonomy</p> <p>Traditional/religious leaders, the government, intellectuals and civil society</p> <p>Society becomes more compartmentalized based on ethnic group and religion</p>	<p>Only at the level of concern.</p> <p>Since only the past 1 or 2 years</p> <p>Only elite groups with vested interests</p> <p>Its implication is not strongly felt</p>	<p>-</p> <p>-</p> <p>-</p> <p>-</p>
ASPECT B OVERALL SCORE	<p>1 – 18 : LOW 19 – 36 : MEDIUM 37 – 60 : HIGH</p>			
C. Tangible form of latent conflict based on ethnic group and religion.	<p>13. Is there any discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity and religion experienced in your environment?</p> <p>14. What are the forms of discrimination?</p> <p>15. Since when has this occurred?</p>	<p>Yes and strongly felt</p> <p>Moving towards severe restrictions such as denial of access to administrative services, denial of permission to set up residence, denial of permission to establish a place of worship, the obligation to pay levies, and inability to participate in the decision-making process in the area</p> <p>Since regional autonomy</p>	<p>Yes but such discriminatory treatment is only confined to several locations</p> <p>Tendency to lay the blame on a particular group when an unpleasant situation occurs</p> <p>Only in the past 1 or 2 years</p>	<p>No.</p> <p>-</p> <p>-</p>

	16. Who has helped perpetuate such discriminatory practices?	Government, traditional/religious leaders, political parties, intellectuals as well as customary/religious policies/laws	Elite groups with vested interests	-
	17. Is there any customary/state policy/law that impedes access to economic sources and employment for natives and outsiders?	Yes, extremely clear-cut and enforceable policies/laws.	Still in the form of social agreements that have yet to be embodied in customary/state laws.	-
<b>ASPECT C OVERALL SCORE</b>	1 – 15 : LOW 16 – 30 : MEDIUM 31 – 50 : HIGH			
D. Forms of resistance that emerge as a reaction from natives or outsiders.	18. Is there any form of resistance from natives and outsiders stemming from suspicion/dislike?	Yes and strongly felt, for instance competing in the contestation of matters related to tradition or religion including traditional or religious ceremony, livelihood, securing decision making positions in the community or government	Not strongly evident	-
<b>ASPECT D OVERALL SCORE</b>	1 – 3 : LOW 4 – 6 : MEDIUM 7 – 10 : HIGH			
E. Gender role in latent conflict based on ethnic group and religion.	19. Do women play a role in perpetuating and strengthening latent conflict based on ethnic group and religion?	An important role ranging from the sensitizing to provocation of such conflict.	Considerable role in the reinforcement of stereotyping.	Do not assume any role
	20. Do women become victims during latent conflict based on ethnic group and religion?	Women and children are the main victims.	Women are not the main victims.	-
	21. What is its concrete form?	Sexual harassment.	Still at the level of stereotyping	-
<b>ASPECT E OVERALL SCORE</b>	1 - 9 : LOW 10 - 18 : MEDIUM 19 - 30 : HIGH			

*Final Score*

Once a score has been attached to each aspect, all scores are then tallied and the result is matched with the following assessment scale:

ASPECT	TOTAL		
	High	Medium	Low
Level of suspicion/dislike based on ethnicity and religion	37-60	19-36	1-18
Sense of security	37-60	19-36	1-18
Tangible form of latent conflict based on ethnic group and religion.	31-50	16-30	1-15
Forms of resistance that emerge as a reaction from natives or outsiders	7-10	4-6	1-3
Gender role in latent conflict based on ethnic group and religion.	19-30	10-18	1-9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>145-240</b>	<b>73-144</b>	<b>1-72</b>

*Meaning of Assessment*

- 1-72      Absence of latent conflict based on ethnicity or religion or the combination of the two.
- 73-144    Presence of latent conflict based on ethnicity or religion or the combination of the two. Unless handled appropriately, it might escalate into an open conflict.
- 145-240   Presence of latent conflict based on ethnicity or religion or the combination of the two which has turned into an open conflict but still considered to be limited in scope.

**CARD C: Assessing Open Conflict Based on Ethnicity and Religion**

Results of Card B assessment serve as input in determining whether latent conflict has escalated into an open conflict. Card C will measure the tendency toward developing into an open conflict. Four aspects have to be assessed to gauge this ethnic- and religious-based open conflict: (a) intensity and quality of open conflict based on ethnicity and religion; (b) causal factors of open conflict; (c) efforts toward conflict resolution and peace building; (d) gender role in open conflict. The assessment of all five aspects will be carried out as follows:

*Matrix of Card C Assessment*

Aspect	Question	SCORE		
		HIGH 7-10	MEDIUM 4-6	LOW 1-3
A. Intensity and quality of open conflict based on ethnicity and religion.	1. Has there ever been an open conflict based on ethnicity and religion?	Yes, an open conflict strongly driven by ethnicity and religion.	Yes, but moderately driven by ethnicity and religion.	No.
	2. Who is involved in this open conflict?	Natives against outsiders or among different ethnic groups and religions.	The ethnicity and religion of conflicting parties cannot be easily distinguished.	-
	3. How many times has this happened within the past 10 years?	More than 3 times.	Between 1-2 times.	-
	4. When did this open conflict begin?	Since regional autonomy	Only in the past 1 or 2 years.	-
	5. Is it a violent conflict?	Yes.	Has not developed into a violent	-

	<p>6. Is the conflict widespread or limited?</p> <p>7. What is the scale of the open conflict in terms of victims and material loss?</p> <p>8. What is its impact to this day?</p>	<p>Conflict has extended to a large area.</p> <p>Resulted in loss of lives, possessions, as well as a significant number of displaced persons</p> <p>Constant fear, trauma and even eviction.</p>	<p>conflict</p> <p>Conflict area is limited.</p> <p>Did not result in fatalities nor material loss.</p> <p>Segmentation between outsiders and natives.</p>	<p>-</p> <p>-</p> <p>-</p>
<b>ASPECT A OVERALL SCORE</b>	<p>1-24 : LOW 25-48 : MEDIUM 49-80 : HIGH</p>			
<b>B. Causal factors of open conflict.</b>	<p>9. What is its main cause or trigger?</p> <p>10. Who are the main actors causing the open conflict?</p>	<p>Stems from latent conflict based on ethnicity or religion or the combination of both, triggered by contestation over economic sources or natural resources</p> <p>Certain ethnic and religious groups including their leaders.</p>	<p>Not entirely caused by ethnic- and religious-based latent conflict.</p> <p>No particular reference to a certain ethnic group or religion.</p>	<p>None</p> <p>-</p>
<b>ASPECT B OVERALL SCORE</b>	<p>1-6 : LOW 7-12 : MEDIUM 13-20 : HIGH</p>			
<b>C. Gender role in open conflict based on ethnicity and religion</b>	<p>11. Are women involved in the open conflict?</p> <p>12. What role do women play?</p> <p>13. Are women and children victims in an open conflict?</p> <p>14. What do women experience in an open conflict?</p>	<p>A less dominant role.</p> <p>Generally more in assisting the provision of logistics.</p> <p>They are generally the main victims.</p> <p>Women are displaced and endure various</p>	<p>A fairly dominant role.</p> <p>Their role is not merely confined to the provision of logistics.</p> <p>Women and children are mainly the victims.</p> <p>Women suffer from various forms of</p>	<p>Women are involved in the peace building process.</p> <p>As peace initiator and facilitator.</p> <p>-</p> <p>-</p>

		forms of violence including rape.	violence but not to the extent of sexual abuse such as rape.	
	15. Are women involved in the peace building effort and conflict resolution?	Women are not involved.	Women are beginning to be involved in the peace process.	Women are involved in the entire peace process.
	16. What role do they play?	Passive participants in the peace process.	Active participants in the peace process.	Peace initiator and facilitator.
<b>ASPECT C OVERALL SCORE</b>	1-18 : LOW 19-36 : MEDIUM 37-60 : HIGH			
<b>D. Conflict resolution and peace building effort.</b>	17. Has any effort been made to settle/mediate an open conflict?	Yes, but it was not seriously carried out.	Yes, and seriously carried out.	Systematic and participatory peace building effort
	18. Who initiated the effort?	Government and traditional/religious leaders.	Public participants	All relevant parties.
	19. How is the process?	Top-bottom process based on instruction.	Bottom – top process.	Participatory process
	20. What is the result?	Less effective in restoring intergroup relations.	Fairly encouraging outcome in restoring intergroup relations	Excellent results.
	21. How do conflicting parties see the peace building effort?	Not in a positive light.	Fairly positive.	Highly positive
	22. How do outsiders see the peace building effort	Not in a positive light	Fairly positive	Highly positive
<b>ASPECT D OVERALL SCORE</b>	1-18 : LOW 19-36: MEDIUM 37-60: HIGH			

*Final Score*

Once a score has been attached to each aspect, all scores are then tallied and the result is matched with the following assessment scale:

ASPECT	TOTAL		
	High	Medium	Low
A. Intensity and quality of open conflict based on ethnicity and religion.	49-80	25-48	1-24
B. Causal factors of open conflict.	13-20	7-12	1-6
C. Gender role in ethnic- and religious-based open conflict	37-60	19-36	1-18
D. Conflict resolution and peace building.	37-60	19-36	1-18
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>109-180</b>	<b>55-108</b>	<b>1-54</b>

*Meaning of Assessment*

- 1-54           Absence of ethnic- and religious-based open conflict.
- 55-108       Presence of open conflict but weak correlation with ethnicity and religion, and within a narrow scope.
- 109-180      Widespread ethnic- and religious-based open conflict and lack of peace building efforts aimed at improving intergroup relations in the community.

**CARD D: Assessment of Identity Strengthening and the Revitalization of Ethnic and Religious Values**

The assessment then proceeds with Card D to determine the extent to which latent conflict among groups has led to the strengthening of identity and the revitalization of values based on ethnicity and religion in a particular community. The six aspects assessed in Card D are: (a) ethnic- and religious-based identities and values that are being promoted; (b) causal factors of identity strengthening; (c) sources used to strengthen identity; (d) efforts to expand the identity strengthening process and the revitalization of ethnic- and religious-based values; (e) impact of identity strengthening and the revitalization of traditional and religious values; (f) gender role. Assessment will be done based on the following matrix.

*Matrix of Card D Assessment*

Aspect	Question	SCORE		
		HIGH 7-10	MEDIUM 4-6	LOW 1-3
F. Ethnic- and religious -based identities and values which are strengthening and being promoted.	1. Is there any ethnic- or religious-based identity and value that is being promoted by various parties in your area?	Yes and followed by a set of formal and informal policies.	Yes but only as a jargon	No.
	2. When was such identity, value, and concept promoted and made popular to the public?	Since regional autonomy	Several years after regional autonomy	-
	3. Did a particular momentum further reinforce the identity and resulted in its further widespread to the general public?	Yes, there was a very distinct momentum.	No particular momentum but several events led to the strengthening of identity	-
	4. Why the need to promote the identity and value?	Aspire to restore and revitalize such identity	Influenced more by tendencies shown by	-

	<p>5. Who initiated (actor/institution) the promotion of the identity and value?</p> <p>6. Did national policies help reinforce the identity strengthening process?</p> <p>7. Is the issue on Christianization or Islamization or Javanization intensifying in your area?</p>	<p>and values to the community.</p> <p>Government, traditional leaders, the media, and influential parties at all levels.</p> <p>Yes, the influence is clearly evident.</p> <p>Strongly felt by the community to the extent of causing concern.</p>	<p>other regions.</p> <p>Elite groups.</p> <p>Yes, but the influence is not as strong.</p> <p>Fairly strong but does not reach the level of anxiety.</p>	<p>-</p> <p>-</p> <p>-</p>
<b>ASPECT A OVERALL SCORE</b>	<p>1-21 : LOW 22-42 : MEDIUM 43-70 : HIGH</p>			
G. Causal factors of the strengthening of ethnic- and religious-based identities and values	8. What are the factors contributing to the strengthening of identity and the revitalization of values based on ethnicity and religion?	The main factor is the indigenous people's perception that they have been unjustly treated and marginalized in their own territory by outsiders and certain ethnic and religious groups.	In addition to the injustices suffered by the natives, the situation is also fuelled by other factors such as political interest.	None.
<b>ASPECT B OVERALL SCORE</b>	<p>1-3 : LOW 4-6 : MEDIUM 7-10 : HIGH</p>			
H. Source of identity strengthening and the revitalization of values being promoted.	<p>9. What sources are drawn on?</p> <p>10. Who has identified and promoted these sources?</p>	<p>Traditional and religious values of the indigenous people.</p> <p>Religious leaders, traditional leaders, intellectuals and those with the authority to do so.</p>	<p>Unclear sources.</p> <p>Elite groups with their own political interest.</p>	<p>None</p> <p>-</p>
<b>ASPECT C OVERALL SCORE</b>	<p>1-6 : LOW 7-12 : MEDIUM 13-20 : HIGH</p>			
I. Efforts to expand	11. Which efforts are done	From	Limited to	None.

public acceptance	<p>to strengthen identity and promote values to ensure widespread acceptance?</p> <p>12. Is there any ethnic- or religious-based organization/institution that serves to strengthen identity and values?</p> <p>13. Is there any effort to capitalize on the promoted identity and values in order to build greater solidarity?</p>	<p>sensitizing efforts, public campaigns to ensuring that home-grown leaders hold strategic positions in the government and other prestigious institutions.</p> <p>A considerable number, and intentionally established for this purpose.</p> <p>Yes, and efforts have been done.</p>	<p>socialization and campaign efforts.</p> <p>Only a handful.</p> <p>Still an intention.</p>	<p>-</p> <p>-</p>
ASPECT D OVERALL SCORE	<p>1-9 : LOW 10-18 : MEDIUM 19-30 : HIGH</p>			
J. Impact of identity strengthening and the restoring of values based on ethnicity and religion	<p>14. What are the impact of identity strengthening and the restoring of values in intergroup relations?</p> <p>15. What are the impact of identity strengthening and of the restoring of values for government policies?</p> <p>16. What is the impact of identity strengthening for the involvement of natives or outsiders in the decision making process from the village to the provincial level</p>	<p>Society tends to be compartmentalized and a restrictive relationship develops between natives and outsiders.</p> <p>Government policies tend to be influenced by religious- and tradition-based values being promoted.</p> <p>Natives are more involved in decision-making while the participation of outsiders are limited and even tend to be passive.</p>	<p>Mild impact.</p> <p>Mild influence.</p> <p>Equal active involvement of natives and outsiders.</p>	<p>None.</p> <p>-</p> <p>-</p>
ASPECT E OVERALL SCORE	<p>1-9 : LOW 10-18 : MEDIUM 19-30 : HIGH</p>			

K. Gender role	<p>17. Do the identities and values being promoted prioritize on male leadership?</p> <p>18. Are women considered as symbols for the creation of an ideal society based on ethnic and religious values?</p> <p>19. Are women being regulated more in efforts to build society and the values being promoted?</p> <p>20. Are women involved in the process of developing these values?</p> <p>21. Have women become victims in the process of the strengthening of identity and values?</p>	<p>Priority is given to male leadership while women are positioned as housewives and supporters of values being promoted.</p> <p>Women are the symbol of purity and guardian of such values.</p> <p>Women are one of the key objects regulated in upholding these values.</p> <p>Extremely limited involvement of women.</p> <p>Women have even less access and carry a heavier load in efforts to uphold these values.</p>	<p>Priority is given to male leadership while also beginning to promote women's leadership</p> <p>Women are considered as symbols but the process of symbolization is not as strong.</p> <p>Women are one of the objects being regulated.</p> <p>Very active involvement of women.</p> <p>Women are not the main victims.</p>	<p>Priority is given to both men's and women's leadership .</p> <p>-</p> <p>-</p> <p>-</p> <p>-</p> <p>-</p>
ASPECT F OVERALL SCORE	<p>1-15 : LOW 16-30 : MEDIUM 31-50 : HIGH</p>			

*Final Score*

Once a score has been attached to each aspect, all scores are then tallied and the result is matched with the following assessment scale:

ASPECT	TOTAL		
	High	Medium	Low
A. Ethnic and religious identities and values being promoted.	43-70	22-42	1-21
B. Causal factors that strengthen identity.	7-10	4-6	1-3
C. Sources brought into play to strengthen identity.	13-20	7-12	1-6
D. Efforts to expand the process of identity strengthening and the revitalization of values based on ethnicity and religion.	19-30	10-18	1-9
E. Impact of the strengthening of traditional and religious identity and values.	19-30	10-18	1-9
F. Gender role	31-50	16-30	1-15
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>127-210</b>	<b>64-126</b>	<b>1-63</b>

*Meaning of Assessment*

- 1-63           Absence of an identity strengthening process and the revitalization of values based on ethnicity, tradition and religion.
- 64-126       Fairly robust process of the strengthening of identity and values based on tradition or religion but on a limited scale.
- 127-210      Rigorous process of the strengthening of traditional and religious identity and values which has now begun to shape public policies.

**CARD E: Assessing the Influence of Identity Strengthening on Public Policy, the Violation of Human Rights and Women’s Rights as well as Ethnic- and Religious-Based Conflict.**

In addition to Cards C and D, Card E is also a follow-up to the outcome of Card B. The question that needs to be answered is whether latent conflict in a community can influence public policy and the upholding of human rights and women’s rights in particular. Four aspects assessed in gauging the effect of traditional and religious identity and values strengthening on public policies are: (a) content of formal state policies; (b) content of unwritten policies; (c) content of customary and religious laws that prevail in a community; (d) public response toward policies based on customary and religious laws. The assessment of all four aspects follows the matrix below.

*Matrix of Card E Assessment*

Aspect	Question	SCORE		
		HIGH 7-10	MEDIUM 4-6	LOW 1-3
A. Content of formal policies issued by the government.	1. Is there any government law from the village to the provincial level in which its content is strongly influenced by traditional/religious values that predominate in your area?	Yes and has been implemented.	Yes but has not been implemented.	No.
	2. When was the law first issued?	Since regional autonomy	Several years after regional autonomy	-

	3. Who pressed on for the enforcement of the law?	Groups fighting for the interest of the natives or outsiders	Groups that merely trail behind	-
	4. How is the process?	Non-participatory.	Involvement of multistakeholders but purely symbolic.	-
	5. Do these laws have the potential to marginalize and discriminate against women?	Considerable potential to marginalize women and this has occurred at certain levels.	Sufficient potential to marginalize women.	-
	6. Do these laws have the potential to marginalize and discriminate against groups outside of those whose values are adopted by the said laws?	Highly potential to marginalize groups outside of the indigenous people.	Sufficient potential to marginalize groups outside of the indigenous people.	-
	7. Do these laws have the potential to marginalize and discriminate against outsiders?	Highly potential to marginalize outsiders.	Sufficient potential to marginalize outsiders.	-
	8. Do these laws have the potential to undermine pluralistic values?	Highly potential to undermine pluralistic values.	Sufficient potential to undermine pluralistic values.	-
<b>ASPECT A OVERALL SCORE</b>	1-24: LOW 25-48: MEDIUM 49-80: HIGH			
<b>B. Content of unwritten policies that prioritizes groups considered as natives.</b>	9. Is there any unwritten policy that designates strategic positions in formal and informal structures to groups considered as natives of the region?	Yes and has been implemented.	Not forceful enough.	No.
	10. When was the policy first implemented?	Since regional autonomy or since the province obtained autonomous status.	Only in the past 1 or 2 years.	-
	11. Who pressed on for the implementation of the policy?	Formal and informal leaders as well as intellectuals from the indigenous	From those with vested interest such as political parties and local government.	-

	<p>12. How is the process?</p> <p>13. What efforts have been done to ensure that such positions are occupied by natives?</p> <p>14. Do these policies marginalize and discriminate against groups considered as outsiders?</p> <p>15. Do these policies marginalize and discriminate against women?</p> <p>16. Do these policies marginalize and discriminate against the poor?</p>	<p>people.</p> <p>Non-participatory.</p> <p>Systematic and intensive efforts have been carried out.</p> <p>Clearly marginalize outsiders.</p> <p>Clearly marginalize women.</p> <p>Clearly discriminate against the poor.</p>	<p>Involvement of various elements of society.</p> <p>Efforts are still sporadic in nature.</p> <p>The impact is still uncertain.</p> <p>The impact is still uncertain.</p> <p>The impact is still uncertain.</p>	<p>-</p> <p>-</p> <p>-</p> <p>-</p> <p>-</p>
<p>ASPECT B OVERALL SCORE</p>	<p>1-24 : LOW 25-48 : MEDIUM 49-80 : HIGH</p>			
<p>C. Content of traditional law that prevails in society.</p>	<p>17. Is there any traditional law that governs groups considered as outsiders including on matters related to economic access?</p> <p>18. When was the law made?</p> <p>19. Who initiated the enforcement of the law?</p> <p>20. How is the process?</p>	<p>Yes and very clear</p> <p>Since regional autonomy or since the region became a full-fledged province</p> <p>Formal and informal leaders and intellectuals from the indigenous people.</p> <p>Non-participatory and top-down approach (from religious or traditional leaders)</p>	<p>Yes but slightly ambiguous</p> <p>Following the tendency of other regions</p> <p>Elite groups with vested interest including political parties</p> <p>Relatively greater involvement of various elements of society although still symbolic in nature</p>	<p>-</p> <p>-</p> <p>-</p> <p>-</p>

	21. Are such laws reinforced by organizations specifically established to protect the interests of natives and to ensure their enforcement through, among others special security personnel based on ethnicity or religion?	Yes	Not clearly apparent	-
	22. Do these policies marginalize and discriminate against outsiders?	Yes, fairly evident	Yes, fairly evident	-
	23. Do these policies marginalize and discriminate against women outsiders?	Yes, clearly evident	Yes, fairly evident	-
	24. Do these policies have the potential to erode good relations between outsiders and natives?	Yes, clearly evident	Yes, fairly evident	-
<b>ASPECT C OVERALL SCORE</b>	1-24 : LOW 25-48 : MEDIUM 49-80 : HIGH			
D. Public response toward these policies.	25. How is the response of the local people toward the aforementioned policies?	Support from groups considered as natives whereas outsiders tend to be passive	Support from natives whereas reaction from outsiders may be in the form of open resistance	-
	26. In the event of opposition from the public, how does the government react to this?	Ignores the response/resistance	Only accommodate grievances without any follow up action	-
<b>ASPECT D OVERALL SCORE</b>	1-6 : LOW 7-12 : MEDIUM 13-20 : HIGH			

*Final Score*

Once a score has been attached to each aspect, all scores are then tallied and the result is matched with the following assessment scale:

ASPECT	TOTAL		
	High	Medium	Low
A. Content of government-issued formal policies	49-80	25-48	1-24
B. Content of unwritten policies	49-80	25-48	1-24
C. Content of customary and religious laws that prevail in society.	49-80	25-48	1-24
D. Public response on policies based on customary and religious laws	13-20	7-12	1-6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>127-260</b>	<b>64-126</b>	<b>1-63</b>

*Meaning of Assessment*

- 1-63                    Traditional/Religious values do not have a bearing on public policies.
- 64-126                Traditional/Religious values fairly shape public policies which may lead to the marginalization and discrimination of women, groups considered as outsiders, and the poor.
- 127-260              Traditional/Religious values profoundly influence the content of public policies which may lead to the marginalization and discrimination of women, groups considered as outsiders, and the poor.

**Patterns of intergroup relations based on assessment results in the community**

When all 5 cards are assessed, at least 5 patterns of intergroup relations in communities can be clarified:

**Zero conflict.** This pattern is revealed when the outcome of Card A assessment is at a low level and thus there shall be no need to proceed to Card B.

**Latent conflict.** This pattern is revealed when the outcomes of Card A and Card B are either medium or high but when the outcomes of Cards C, D, and E are low.

**Open conflict.** This pattern is revealed when the outcomes of Card A, B, and C are medium or high the when the outcomes of Cards D and E are low.

**Identity strengthening.** This pattern is revealed when: (a) the outcomes of Cards A, B, and D are medium or high and the outcomes of Card C and E are low, and; (b) the outcomes of Cards A, B, C, and D assessment are medium or high but the outcome of Card E is low.

**Identity Politics.** This pattern is established when: (a) the outcomes of Cards A, B, and D are medium or high but the outcomes of Cards C and E are low; (b) the outcomes of Cards A, B, C, D, and E assessment are medium or high, and; (c) the outcomes of Cards A, B, D, and E assessment are medium or high Card C has a low outcome.

In 2008 *KAPAL Perempuan* has applied the assessment card approach in four villages on Bali, Gorontalo, and Central Kalimantan. The results show that all four villages exhibit a relatively similar assessment outcome. An identity politics pattern is found in all four villages where ethnic- and religious-based identity strengthening has permeated into public policy-making. To some extent this public policy-making has been discriminatory and in violation of the rights of outsiders, minority and marginalized groups, and women.

## Experiences of the participating communities

Communities participating in FGDs held in all four villages are now capable of defining the pluralism situation in their respective areas through the application of the five assessment cards. *First*, they now understand that the mutual feeling of suspicion among members of the community will continue to put a strain on their lives due to the unresolved latent conflict inflamed since the New Order regime. During the decentralization period, this latent conflict can easily be triggered and can escalate into an open conflict leading to violence. *Second*, they are now more aware of the process involved in ethnic- and religious-based identity strengthening of the indigenous population prompted by their disillusionment with the development outcome thus far achieved. They feel left behind and pushed into poverty while newcomers to the area have benefited from the development process. Decentralization has opened up opportunities for them to regain their right to govern their own territories and to receive adequate sources of livelihood to ensure their well-being. Their struggles are not merely confined to the fight for recognition but also to the need for legitimization and power. Formal politics and public policies then become an appropriate medium for them to defend their identity.

In actual implementation, ethnic- and religious-oriented policies are discriminatory and tend to ignore the rights of minority and marginalized groups, as well as women. This situation is understood by one of the village residents in Gorontalo who took part in the FGD on the pluralism cards who said, "This assessment card approach has allowed me to actually see the ongoing process of identity strengthening and identity politics in Gorontalo with the potential of further marginalizing minority groups."

Such awareness has become a catalyst for those involved in the FGDs in all four villages in Bali, Gorontalo and Central Kalimantan to seek for effective solutions and recommendations aimed at strengthening pluralistic values within (primarily) the public sphere of their communities. They are now capable of early detection that will enable them to find the best solution. A local facilitator, who is also a university student, who has been involved with the pluralism cards mentioned: "From this assessment card, we can clearly conclude that the people of Central Kalimantan are still traumatized by their past ordeal and live in constant fear of a repeat incident despite the fact that the conflict has long ended. This is probably where we should find the solution." This approach has also helped the community to participate in creating good governance at the village level as mentioned by a Pastor who took part in the village FGD in Central Kalimantan: "These assessment cards are crucial in monitoring government policies as we can now jointly conduct advocacy work to initiate policy changes that embrace pluralistic values."

## Challenges

Although the pluralism cards are very useful for society and government as an instrument to detect potential conflicts and violations of human rights - including the rights of women and minorities - many serious challenges have to be faced if we want to popularize these pluralism cards.

The biggest challenge comes from conservative groups who consider their religion and ethnicity as the most or the only correct one. To defend themselves, they sometimes use violent means. Intimidations and threats cause fear among pluralism activists to advocate pluralism issues. Meanwhile, law enforcement in Indonesia has not been able to fully protect its citizens. In this context, it is of great importance that the pluralism cards are processed properly and that all elements of society are involved in the assessment process.

A second challenge comes from a lack of knowledge among community members about pluralism and from taboos to discuss the intergroup relations and latent conflict within their communities. In this context it is imperative to organize public education about pluralism.

A third challenge, of course, comes from the cards itself. For some villagers the pluralism cards still appear to be quite difficult to understand if the questions are not formulated in their own local language. Therefore it is important to improve and translate the pluralism cards so that they can be easily read and understood by the general public, especially people at the grass roots.

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ISSN 1879-7172

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