

Essay 2

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Evelina Dagnino

Civic Driven Change and Political Projects

Clarifying the Terrain

A crucial task in establishing a narrative of civic-driven change (CDC) is to discuss the meaning(s) of civic and civic agency. This effort can contribute to a clearer understanding of our main object, or, at least, a recognition of its problematic and complex nature. This is not only necessary for conceptual and political clarity. Both would be hampered if the idea of civic agency is approached as if it enjoyed a common meaning. Recognizing the diversity of meanings coexisting in the real world acknowledges the conflicts and disputes between different and often divergent and antagonist conceptions. To the extent in which different conceptions are related to different political projects of 'what society should be', this recognition should also cast light on 'what kind of change' is at stake in different types and understanding of civic agency. It will help to answer the questions: who must change, who will benefit and who will be short-changed by it? In the context of aided-change by donors, it is crucial to recognize that civic agency is a political field transversed by power relations. Aid agencies tend to depoliticize their own - and others' - agency by seeing it as strictly 'humanitarian' and/or presided by concerns with 'development' and fighting 'poverty', thus often reducing it to a 'technical', philanthropic, 'apolitical' and 'objective' matter.

An additional reason to emphasize divergences between conceptions relates to the contemporary political scenario in many parts of the world and certainly in Latin America and in Brazil. Such sites are characterized, I argue, by an apparent 'discursive homogeneity', where the same references, terms and words are used, but with different meanings and intentions by various political subjects. Neo-liberals, radical democracy supporters and even conservatives find themselves using the same political vocabulary, in which civic and correlated concepts such as civil society, citizenship and participation,

are central. Far from expressing a genuinely consensual view, this apparent homogeneity generates a situation that can be described as a 'perverse confluence'. The perversity stems from the fact that this pseudo-unanimity conceals conflicts and dilutes disputes between different political projects, ¹ creating confusion, distortion and misperceptions.²

Consequently, attempts to discuss the different meanings of 'civic' and its correlates may be a hard, endless task. In order to avoid this a few criteria are necessary as a guide. First, is not to arrive at a false consensus on a single meaning but rather to make differences and divergences explicit, both among ourselves as authors and in the experiences we are trying to narrate. Second, despite normative dimensions discussed later, arguments should be rooted in specific concrete realities, not in desires or specific political intentions. Third, argument is necessarily contextualized and historicized, since the formulation of political projects and the related attribution of meanings and adoption of a particular political vocabulary or repertoire are obviously conditioned by distinct experiences and contexts.

Let me begin by pointing out two interrelated but different meanings of 'civic' - both preliminary and general - that I think have to be considered in our discussion:

- (i) Civic as a 'location', defined as pertaining to citizens and/or to civil society, to 'lifeworld', as opposed to the state and to the market;
- (ii) Civic as an 'attribute', an 'inherent' virtue, which derives from that 'location' and only from it, and, therefore, is not present in other locations.³

These two understandings suffer from the same problems found in some definitions of civil society. First, they homogenize a field (citizens and/or their organizations) that is heterogeneous and diverse by nature. Second, by naturalizing a 'virtuous' quality, as being intrinsic to this field, they end up by idealizing and mystifying it. An alternative way to look at the civic as a virtuous attribute is to recognize that it may or may not

result from a historical/empirical creation, which implies that it is not necessarily or intrinsically there. In this case, as in much of the real world, and depending on how we understand it, the 'civic' may be absent and its construction would be precisely the kind of change required. And this should not be reduced to mobilization/organizing, as if the civic is to be thought of as a set of specific contents and drives for action.

Alan Fowler has suggested that a critical task would be 'to interrogate the ontological essence of civicness in relation to contending political projects, their actors and the material base from which they emerge and subsist'.⁴ This assumes that there is an ontological essence of civicness. One challenge here is to think about what ideas could deserve this position without incurring the reductive risks pointed out above. One possibility is to resort to ideas that share a conception of a basis for life 'in society'. They run from Hannah Arendt's 'common world', to Marshall's 'participation in the social heritage'; 'a sort of basic human equality'; 'the claim for recognition as full members of society'. They may include Patrick Pharo's notion of an 'ordinary civility', a set of rules (formalized or not, written or not) that make social relations and life in society possible: rules for coexistence, built in the intersubjective dimensions of social life, that only exist to the extent in which they are mutually recognized. What seems to be common in these views is a sort of basic preliminary layer of meaning in the civic: a disposition to live together in society, which sounds reasonable, is largely shared and thus difficult to dismiss.⁵

If this predispositional formulation is acceptable, then a further layer of meaning in the civic, also present in those ideas and in many others, is a 'requirement' for living together: equality. At this level, inclusion of this normative dimension still seems sensible and consensual. The question of equality as an element of the civic sheds light on the role of the state. Such a role refers not only to contributing to ensure rules for 'coexistence' beyond its repressive character, but mainly to ensure equal rights to all citizens.⁶ This condition constitutes the ground on which 'civicness' can grow and survive in a sustainable manner.

Nevertheless, while equality establishes a connection between civicness, social justice, citizenship and democracy, it introduces grounds for differentiation and divergence.⁷ Thus, different understandings of these ideas, associated to different political projects, imply different directions to civic agency. It should be clear that this connection is one possibility among many others (such as religion, for instance). But all these different links - historically and contextually produced - shape the meanings of civic and civic agency: its contents, its subjects, its concrete forms, its locations. Recognizing this diversity, and the dispute that pervades it, is a crucial preliminary task.

The connection between civic agency and democracy has been predominant in Brazil and in most of Latin America for the last decades. In Brazil, from the mid-70s on, such a

struggle brought together an increasing number of different social agents, including the so-called 'new social movements'. A few features of that context need to be mentioned. First, such unity, made possible by the struggle against a common 'enemy', marks the emergence of civil society as a unified actor. The term became a central element in the political vocabulary. Second, the struggle, originally directed towards the re-establishment of liberal representative democracy, the rule of law and the defense of human rights, gradually evolved to include discussion of different models of democracy, which then formed the basis for the formulation of different political projects. Third, and most importantly, the idea of citizenship, emerging from a widened conception of human rights but also from historical struggles around social rights in the 30s and 40s, soon became a crucial reference for social movements. Citizenship and its significant principle of equal rights, emerged as a way to operationalize, so to speak, the often abstract notion of democracy, bringing it down to the concrete claims of ordinary people.

Increasingly adopted since the mid-80s and 90s by popular movements, excluded groups, non-governmental organizations, trade unions and left parties as a central element in their political strategies, the notion of citizenship spread first as a common reference among a variety of social movements. Women, blacks and ethnic minorities, homosexuals, retired and senior citizens, consumers, environmentalists, urban and rural workers and those organized around urban issues in the large cities, such as housing, health, education, unemployment, violence, etc., all found in the reference to citizenship not only a useful tool in their specific struggles but also, in some cases, a powerful articulating link among them.⁸ The general claim for equal rights, embedded in the predominant conception of citizenship, was then extended and specified according to the different claimants and claims at stake.

As part of this process of redefining citizenship, a strong emphasis was put on its cultural dimension, incorporating contemporary concerns with subjectivities, identities and the right to difference.⁹

Citizenship became a prominent notion in the last decades because it has been recognized as a crucial weapon in the struggle against social and economic exclusion and inequality or against the social authoritarianism that pervades our cultures. But - most importantly - it is also applied in the widening and challenging of the dominant conceptions of politics itself. Thus, the redefinition of citizenship undertaken mainly by social movements and other constituents of civil society in Latin America intended, in the first place, to confront the existing boundaries of what is defined as the political arena: its participants, its institutions, its processes, its agenda and its scope.¹⁰ The broadening of the definition of politics in order to make possible the acknowledgement of new subjects, themes, spaces and institutions has been a crucial step towards not simply the reestablishment of democracy in authoritarian countries but rather towards the 'democratization of democracy' or its deepening. Under

the motto 'new ways of doing politics', civil society was affirmed as a legitimate terrain of politics, and the new subjects and themes emerging in its domain have been asserted as political.¹¹

The broadening of the conception of politics, linked to the views on democracy and a redefined citizenship implied a strong emphasis on the idea of participation. Deepening political engagement was seen as a condition for democracy to fulfil its promises of equality. Given the historical failure of liberal-representative democracy to cope with inequality and exclusion, the participation of civil society was perceived as an indispensable mechanism to guarantee changes in that direction.¹² Moreover, participation had been expressed in strong terms, as the sharing of political power, especially the sharing of decision making over public policies destined to ensure equal rights to all citizens.

Worthy of note is that the word 'civic' was not present in the political vocabulary of the redemocratization period. On the contrary, it was strongly linked to the military regime. A couple of days before the military coup in 1964, a large crowd, mostly upper and middle-class women, demonstrated in the streets of Rio de Janeiro. They demanded a reaction against the reformist democratic government, in the name of the defense of traditional values such as Family, Property and Tradition, supposedly threatened by communists and by the government's reform project. They called themselves a 'civic movement'. It was the only evidence of 'popular' support given to the military coup. In addition, once installed in power, the military introduced mandatory courses on 'Moral and Civic Education' in the school system, including in universities.

Throughout the 1980s, during an extraordinarily effervescent political process, those democratizing ideas played a very strong role in framing the meaning of civic agency. It was predominantly associated with a variety of political actions directed towards the building of citizenship, assuming a multiplicity of forms. From the assertion of 'the right to have rights'¹³ to the claim for extending already existing formal rights, to the creation of new ones. The connection between citizenship and civic agency infused the political debate and specific struggles in the period. The story of the People's Assembly (*Assembléia do Povo*), a *favelado* movement created in Campinas, S. Paulo, in 1979, illustrates this process.

One Story

In 1967, Campinas had around 350,000 inhabitants. The establishment of an Industrial District, intended to create 80,000 jobs, made the city a centre of attraction for migrants. Most came from rural areas and without the qualifications needed to work in the large industries of the region. As a result, the population of *favelas* ('shanty towns') boomed by 583 per cent, from 1973 to 1980, with the consequent deterioration in the already miserable

conditions of life. In 1979, *favelados* began to organize themselves, first in neighbourhood associations, later expressed as a city-wide People's Assembly (*Assembléia do Povo*, AP), bringing together 60 per cent of the city *favelas*, and bringing up to 6,000 people in demonstrations in front of the City Hall. The first steps of this organizing process began through individual actions, illustrated by the history of Dona Marlene, one of the main leaders of AP, with whom I had a series of interviews.¹⁴

Marlene, a rural migrant herself, had to move into the *favela* by the early 70s and began her struggle by going by herself to the City Hall to demand the installation of tap water. The answer was that *favelas* were on the City's land 'which belongs to the Mayor' and that running water could not be installed there.

'Everyone drank water from the faucet, but in the favela we had to drink water from the well. The water was full of little worms. 'Why is it that everybody can have running water installed and we can't?' I asked. (...) Once I went there and they told me: 'If your water is no good, leave! Leave! And shut your mouth!' 'What right have you to say this?' I asked. 'I am a government employee and that land is the Mayor's land.' 'What Mayor's land are you talking about? If that was the Mayor's land, he would be living there with us, he would be a *favelado* himself! That is the land of poor people like us, who do not have a decent salary (...) if you have the right to drink a glass of water from a faucet, we have it too. We are citizens like you; we are human beings like you'.

In fact, in Latin-American societies, we can discern the initial stages in such a process: when people begin to organize themselves in social movements they soon learn that their first task is to affirm their right to have rights. This is what Dona Marlene expressed very clearly:

'We began to struggle for the right to the land. We didn't have this right to struggle for the right to the land. Because they thought we were taking land which wasn't ours, it belonged to the City Government'.

She went on, explaining it very carefully and spelling out a view of the state that is crucial to the conceptions of the deepening of democracy as a radical notion of popular sovereignty, of participation and of a redefined citizenship, as mentioned before.

'You have to look closely at the City Government: it owns nothing. Nothing! Neither the Mayor nor anybody else there owns anything; when they enter there they do not become owners, they become employees of the people. Everybody has the right to claim what he or she wants and they have the duty to answer if it is right, if it is wrong, but they must answer. (...) Because they [people in City Hall] didn't have anything. The strength they had came from the people, it was not theirs. You never saw a bird flying without its feathers; it needs the feathers to fly. And the feathers they have are not theirs. If they are up in those heights,

who put them there? So I began to see this and then I began to lose any fear I had'.

The People's Assembly (AP) could count on a network of support - although in those times this magical word was not in fashion as it is today - that was fundamental to its success. Other social movements, trade unions, intellectuals and university professors and students, small leftist political parties (by then illegal), the progressive Catholic Church, etc., contributed with resources of various types: financial, informational, political, technical and so on. However, there was a strong concern about the need to preserve 'the autonomy of the movement' (also reflected in the essay by Teivo Teivainen). Given a past history of relations of control, subordination and tutelage between popular organizations and the state and political parties, including leftist ones, during the populist period, was a principle very much cherished within the democratic Left.

The strategies of the movement varied. One of their first public initiatives was to ask the media to publicise the results of their own survey of the *favelas*. The intention was to show the city that residents were not idlers, misfits, or prostitutes, as they were assumed to be, but decent working citizens who therefore should be seen as bearers of rights. They would promote huge demonstrations in front of the City Hall, demanding the presence of the Mayor to listen to their claims for the right to the use of the land. After a few of these demonstrations, the Mayor finally showed up and agreed to start negotiations. Helped by sympathetic lawyers, the People's Assembly produced a bill that would legalize the right to land and convinced the Mayor to send it to the City Council, which voted it down. Dona Marlene's long and dramatic narration of the voting night illustrates the complexity of the movement's relationship with the political system.¹⁵

'We took the bill to the City Council and they kept promising they would vote on it and they didn't. We had to pressure them. It was a weapon we had. You have to demand what you need and what you believe in. It doesn't matter if they vote wrongly but you make your point clear (...) what you know from the struggle, what you know from living. We went there that night with 150 people. A lot of them still had their lunch pails, they had come straight from work... Finally the vote was set for 12.30 a.m. because that's when the last buses depart... We decided to stay there overnight... When the voting finally started, they called the names of the Counsellors one by one and they stood up, saying 'No, no, no'. Only two or three voted in favour of our bill. One of them [an opponent] made a speech challenging the *favelados*: *favelados* didn't have worker identification cards [*carteira assinada*], *favelados* didn't have a place to live, *favelados* lived like rats. He spoke a lot. Listening to him made everybody sad. A woman started to cry. Me, cry? No way I am going to cry here in front of these kind of people! And I began to yell: 'Do you know why *favelados* are like this? Because you are nothing but thieves, wretches! When you are looking for

votes you come with a straight face, just so you can be here tonight and betray everybody!' I started to call them names, I wanted to throw chairs at them but the chairs were all fastened to the floor! I wanted to break everything there that night. And I said, showing them my voter's card: 'Wait for us! Our active voice is here, this is how we will talk to you, with our vote, a vote of responsibility, a vote of struggle, a vote of knowledge! Because, so far, our vote has been betrayed. We were deceived by false hopes. Nothing you promise when you look for votes ever happens!' (...) Then the police came... That day I didn't feel afraid, I only felt outrage for having fought so hard, for having looked to the authorities, for their refusal to entertain a solution in accord with our struggle, and for punishing us the way they did'.

This experience represented a turning point in the movement. The *favelados* realized the importance of electing Counsellors committed to their struggle and to popular interests. The *Assembléia* then decided to nominate three of its participants as candidates in the forthcoming City Council 1982 election. They also decided to run under the newly formed *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers' Party, PT). Such a decision expressed a significant rupture with old views on the nature of politics, like those Dona Marlene expressed when referring to her experience in the countryside:

'Politics was always domination. Nobody could talk about politics because it was something belonging to those who were above us, those governing, not to us. We had to live dominated by these powers and could say nothing'.

Party affiliation is generally considered in the literature as a problematic issue within popular movements.¹⁶ The main argument is that party affiliation can break up the hard-won unity of a movement and is usually avoided. However, this does not appear to be a universal rule. It depends on the concrete options available and on the particular experience of each movement. The creation of the Workers' Party (PT) was a direct product of struggles of social movements as well as trade unions. One can state that the very existence of the People's Assembly was crucial in determining the emergence and the shape of the party in Campinas. The connection between the *Assembléia* and the party was very clear to the great majority of the members, who had either participated in or supported the local organization of the PT. For them, at that particular moment, the new party represented the continuity of their own struggle and its extension into the institutional political level. Negative reactions from all the other parties, as evidenced by the famous City Council vote, only reinforced this choice. To Dona Marlene, one of the people chosen to run by the *Assembléia*, party affiliation was a clear option.

The experience of the *Assembléia* shows a process of constructing civicness, clearly exemplified in the trajectory of Dona Marlene. A range of political actions constitut-

ed this process. Ordinary people get together searching for solutions for their needs. Understanding needs as rooted in the inequality that organizes society; perceiving and presenting them as rights. Thousands of people articulating around the same goals; identifying the state as the agent to whom those claims to rights shall be directed. People inventing different forms of struggle; looking for support in other sectors of society; learning how political society functions and engaging in daring efforts to penetrate it; setting exemplary paths and mechanisms that helped others to organize in other places.

In spite of its specificities, the *Assembléia* was far from being an isolated case. The 1980s were very fertile years for civic agency directed towards the building of citizenship and the widening and deepening of democracy. Those ideas became articulated into a democratic-participatory project, which was able to gain a significant influence in Brazil. Thanks to a very favourable correlation of forces largely due to a strong mobilization of social movements and other sectors of civil society, especially the progressive Catholic Church, the 1988 Constitution expressed the formal landmark of this process. Known as the 'Citizen Constitution', it enlarged rights, confirmed the principle of participation of society in political decisions and created public spaces with equal representation of civil society and governments destined to the formulation of public policies - the 'Management Councils'.¹⁷

Consequently, during the 1990s, the possibility of joint action between civil society and the state largely replaced the confrontation that characterized the relations between them in the previous period. This possibility needs to be understood within a context in which the principle of participation of society became a distinguishing feature of this project, underlying the very effort to create public spaces for these joint actions. This particular history invites a critical view of the idea of a 'civic domain' and of the relations between state (and political society) and civil society, which are explored later.

Changes in Context

One year after the approval of the new Constitution, in 1989, the first direct presidential election after 29 years brought Fernando Collor to power. This moment introduced the neo-liberal project in Brazil. Implementation of this project required the shrinking of social responsibilities of the state and their transfer to civil society. Among its consequences, there was a deep inflection in the political culture of Brazil, as in most countries of Latin America, with a decisive impact upon the understandings of civic agency. In this connection, a few points need to be mentioned.¹⁸

First, although the neo-liberal project is associated with liberal representative democracy, its basic idea is the notion that the state and its relationships to society need to be adjusted to the demands of a new moment in the relations of capitalist accumulation. This primary impulse marks the internal logic that structures the neo-liberal

project. It does not offer a diagnosis of society in which the concern for democracy is central. In other words, the question of democracy as understood within the participatory project has little to do with the impulse behind the neo-liberal project. Rather, the latter's central concern is the need to adjust the economy by removing barriers to the expansion of large scale international capital, particularly within or throughout the Third World, and the desire to free the market of obstacles that could impede its functioning as an organizing principle of social life.

Second, the configuration of a new relationship between state and society, expressed in the neo-liberal project, also seem to be determined (particularly in Latin America) by an assessment of the characteristics of the state that make it inadequate in the context of a new reality. Thus, a state that is characterized by huge size, inefficiency, excessive bureaucracy and corruption, would encounter in this new relationship a route toward more efficient forms of action. In addition to the privatization of state enterprises, the transfer of the state's social responsibilities to individuals, civil society and the private sector are considered fundamental for the paring down and reduction of the state.

Third, the pre-eminence of the market as a reorganizing axis of the economy is seen as worthy of extension to the rest of society. The search for efficiency and modernization thus works to legitimize the adoption of the market as the organizing principle of social, political and cultural life. The transfer of market logic to the state arena transforms governments into 'service providers' and citizens into 'clients' and 'users'. Sensitivity toward their demands and efficiency in attending to them become institutional imperatives. How are these ideas affecting previous conceptions of civic agency, embodied in the notions of civil society, participation and citizenship?

The place for 'civil society' participation from the neo-liberal perspective is two-fold. On the one hand, it should supply state and market with qualified information on social demands. On the other, it is seen as providing organizations with the ability to efficiently assume the execution of public policies oriented toward the satisfaction of these demands. Thus, civil society is conceived in a selective and exclusionary way, recognizing only those that are able to carry out these tasks.

In this sense, the neo-liberal project adopted by most governments in Latin America shapes the so-called civic domain and its subjects. The reconfiguration of civil society is reflected in the accelerated growth and the new role that has been taken on by Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). It is also seen in the emergence of the so-called Third Sector and of entrepreneurial foundations, with a strong emphasis on a redefined form of philanthropy; and the marginalization (what some authors have referred to as the 'criminalization') of social movements.¹⁹ The result has been a reductive identification of 'civil society' with NGOs, and even a mere synonym for 'Third Sector'. Governments fear the politicization of their engagement with social movements and workers' organi-

6 zations, and seek reliable partners who can effectively respond to their demands while minimizing spaces of conflict.

The conception of 'participation' that integrates the neo-liberal project is indicative of its general principles.²⁰ Participation is defined instrumentally, in relation to the needs that are spawned by structural adjustments that have been called for, particularly the reduction of the state through the transfer of its social responsibilities to civil society and to the private sector. On the one hand, for constituents of civil society such as NGOs, participation means taking on the efficient execution of social policies, though the definition of the latter remains under exclusive state control. Participation is thus concentrated in functions of management and policy implementation yet does not include decision-making power in relation to them.²¹

On the other hand, in order to compensate for the retreat of the state, in the name of social solidarity society as a whole is called upon to participate, assuming responsibilities in the war on poverty and marginalization. The very idea of 'solidarity', the great motto of participation as it has been redefined, thus loses the political and collective significance it has within other political projects. Instead, it takes its place in the private terrain of morality where the emergence of so-called 'solidary participation' and the emphasis on volunteer work and 'social responsibility' (both of individuals and of firms) take precedence. The basic principle seems to be the adoption of a privatizing and individualistic perspective, capable of replacing and redefining the collective notion of social participation.²²

The neo-liberal project also incorporates the notion of 'citizenship', redefining it according to its own guiding principles. The key element in this redefinition is the dilution of exactly that which constitutes the nucleus of the notion of citizenship: the idea of universal rights. This process is visible in several dimensions of the implementation of the neo-liberal project. First, social rights, which were consolidated in spite of the precarious nature of the Latin American welfare state, are now being eliminated as they are seen as an obstacle to the free modernizing action of the market. Second, in social policy management, the conception of universal rights as a parameter and an instrument for the construction of equality is replaced by targeted and emergency efforts directed toward those sectors of society that are at risk situations. Third, citizenship is pushed into the arena of the market, establishing a seductive connection between the two terms. To become a citizen increasingly comes to mean individual integration into the market, as consumer and producer.²³ In a context where the state is progressively exempted from its role as guarantor of rights, the market is expected to step in to offer a surrogate space for citizenship. Fourth, with the transfer of social policies to civil society organizations, to philanthropy and volunteer work, citizenship is both identified with, and reduced to, solidarity with the poor and needy, tasks that in turn are most often seen as mere charity. The people who are the target population of these

policies are not seen as citizens, possessing the 'right to have rights', but as 'needy' human beings who must be taken under the wing of public and private charities.

The conceptions of citizenship, civil society and participation formulated by the neo-liberal project express a similar depoliticizing intention and are therefore bearers of what we could call a minimalist view of politics. This view, which reacts against the widening of the sphere of politics that the democratizing efforts of the participatory democracy project has struggled to carry out, is translated into its opposite. It seeks the reduction of the spaces, subjects, themes and processes that have been considered constitutive of politics. Where a widened view of politics includes civil society as a legitimate political arena and emphasizes citizenship as a process of constitution of political subjects, i.e., civic agents, the minimalist version of politics has different characteristics.

In the first place, it is based on the selective reduction of civil society to specific types of organizations, with the subsequent exclusion of other actors, and on the very redefinition of its role to providing compensation for the state's absence in the implementation of social policies. The replacement of the term 'civil society' by 'Third Sector' is indicative of this new function and demonstrates the attempt to withdraw the constituting role of civil society in the terrain of politics. The latter is once again limited to political society. Self-defined as apolitical, the Third Sector, in turn, reinforces a statist conception of power and politics, precisely the one that participatory democracy's view of civil society, which confronts the monopoly of power by the state and political society, has been directed against.²⁴

In the second place, policies and the issues that they take up are treated strictly from a technical or philanthropic angle. As a consequence, poverty and inequality are withdrawn from the public (political) arena and from their proper domain, that of justice, equality and citizenship. The distribution of social services and benefits increasingly replaces the space of rights and citizenship, through a double movement. On the one hand, social rights are being simply eliminated or replaced by goods to be provided by private companies, negotiated in the market by those who can afford it. On the other hand, NGOs increasingly assume the distribution of social services such as health care and education, targeting specific needy sectors of the population. These social services, whose distribution depends entirely on the good will and competence of the NGOs involved, are not perceived by the beneficiaries as public responsibilities of the state. Very often, in exchange for tax exemptions, private companies finance projects led by NGOs. The groups benefited do not even know that public resources are involved. Rather, benefits are presented as favours of well-intentioned people, replacing the rights to be guaranteed by the state. Citizenship as the universal entitlement to rights and as a relation between the state and all citizens is diluted. In this model of implementing social policies, the state hides itself behind NGOs. A central cultural and political

consequence is the obstruction of the demand for rights for which no place is left, since NGOs cannot be held responsible for rights and the state is absent even when public resources are involved. The very possibility of the formulation of rights and of notions of citizenship, as crucial elements in the construction of civiness, and the enunciation itself of a notion of the public sphere, as distinct from the private, become increasingly difficult.²⁵

In the third place, the privatization of poverty and inequality - the most urgent issues in Latin America - contrasts starkly with recent efforts to create public spaces for discussing these issues. This process is defended by the democratic project as a way of widening the political debate so that conflicts between divergent interests can be publicly exposed and negotiated within democratic parameters.

Cloistered within the traditional institutions of representative democracy, these reductive neo-liberal politics are accompanied by a similarly minimalist view of democracy. Both politics and democracy are restricted to the bare minimum. Echoing the state's ability to allocate resources, there is a selective shrinking of these associated notions, producing a deepening exclusion of those subjects, themes and processes that could present a threat to the progress of the neo-liberal project.

In contrast to a conception that recognizes the centrality of conflict and of democracy as the best way of dealing with the latter, this minimalist vision attempts to confine conflict or make it invisible, that is, when it is not given a technocratic and managerial treatment. This fundamental characteristic of the neo-liberal project is at the root of the critique of those who consider it to be a 'fascist pluralism'²⁶ or a kind of totalitarianism centred on the triad 'privatization of the public, destitution of speech and annulment of politics.'²⁷

Another Story

To the detriment of other actors, the implementation of the neo-liberal project in Brazil and the new configuration assumed by the state, which includes the transference of its social responsibilities to civil society and to the private sector, has stimulated an increasing pre-eminence of NGOs as civic agents. As a result, the very meaning of civic agency has been heavily redefined. This development, generalized in most countries in Latin America, imposes the need to examine the NGOs more closely. Data from interviews conducted with 34 Brazilian NGOs²⁸ reveal these changes and tell another story about civic agency and change. As NGOs multiplied, civic initiatives described in our first story decreased. Although other factors contributed to this change, it is clear that the role of the state in favouring NGOs played an important role.

An initial consideration is that, in spite of the impact of the neo-liberal project, the field of NGOs (as that of civil society) in Brazil is very heterogeneous. Thus, it would be unfair to homogenize their role and ignore the diversity of NGOs. Not only in terms of their political

projects but particularly in terms of their specific relationships with the state, and on the other hand, with social movements. The interviews clearly show these differences and reflect an ongoing tension between different conceptions.

The state-influenced multiplication of NGOs after the introduction of the neo-liberal project cannot obscure that the origin of many of these organizations in the 1980s had been very much rooted in their close relations with social movements of various kinds. Their activities then included consultancies and support to the specific needs of these movements: political formation, technical support, information and communication resources and functions of articulation. Such relations were based on political convictions about the importance of supporting and facilitating the mobilization and organization of civic agents excluded from political power. As the state looked for reliable partners, NGOs became a favourite target and most of them could refuse neither the resources that came with the so-called 'partnerships' (*parcerias*) nor the opportunities for participation. Very often, the partnerships to develop specific projects were announced as pilot experiments, to be later incorporated into universal social policies, in which NGOs could grasp the opportunity to influence state policies. Nevertheless, since resources were scarce such interaction just never happened. Hence, it seems that World Bank recommendations played a more important role in the neo-liberal approach to NGOs' participation, praised by their potential to 'reach poor communities and remote areas at low cost', as well as 'the skills and resources they bring to emergency relief and development activities'.²⁹

But the new role of NGOs also imposed new requirements and the relationships with social movements became less and less important, even for those NGOs that continue to share an egalitarian democratic project. Instead, an emphasis was put on complying with the new requirements: institutional and professional consolidation, technical competence, and pragmatism. A conception of efficacy as the production of measurable results increasingly replaces the previous emphasis on the process of stimulating and supporting civic agency.

'Quantitative indicators are not appropriate to our kind of work. Other indicators, that we do not have, are needed. How do you assess the impact within the social context? (...) This is the problem: democracy requires time. (...) They want the product, the results. And we work fundamentally with the process. What is happening is the [NGOs'] inclusion in this project' (Interview 1).

None of the NGOs interviewed criticized this professionalization per se, although recognizing that it had been a result of 'external factors'. These included not only the reconfiguration of the state but also the requirements of international development agencies. According to one of the interviews, these requirements are related to the pressure put on international agencies, especially in Europe, to increase 'their impact' (Interview 3).

However, they are aware of the meaning of these changes and the options they entail:

'We will continue to invest at the grassroots level, build mobilizations and so on. If, before the 1990s, the NGOs had little technical competence and much political discussion, the danger of the 1990s is for us to have excess of technique and depoliticize the discussion. This is something that we are beginning to realize and perhaps it won't happen, to make our work strictly technical' (Interview 2).³⁰

The risk of depoliticization is a concern to those NGOs committed to a project of deepening democracy, which would be able to incorporate new actors and their demands. They see themselves as fostering political action from those actors, through a role of mediation and support to less structured civic agents, especially popular social movements. For NGOs sustaining other projects, presided by old or new versions of philanthropy, such a concern does not exist.

Some NGOs perceived the risks involved in this redefinition of priorities and forms of action and in the possibilities of new roles.

'If you enter the game, you legitimate something you don't want to. You have to push this limit, you have to say no, because it used to be worse, there were times (when the World Bank required the participation of NGOs in certain projects, it still does) when the projects would come ready, 'this is the project'. 'No, it is not like that, we have to see with the community if this is their priority, how they will participate'. 'No, the project cannot be changed'. If it cannot be changed, then [the answer is] no' (Interview 1).

Others are less optimistic about the future ahead and emphasize the consequences of the changes over the relationships between NGOs and popular social movements.

'This is [now] considered a backward view, when I say: our role is the strengthening of the subjects, our presence in the public scene happens in certain specific moments' (Interview 3).

'What we see is that, as NGOs have more information, they end up occupying almost completely these spaces [of participation]. There is a saturation of NGOs and the participation of movements is smaller. (...) Before, the resources were like that: the movements have difficulties in administering resources due to their political and institutional instability; the priority is to give resources to the NGOs because they are more efficient structures and their political and institutional stability is much greater. When the NGOs work with the movements, there is a sort of indirect transfer of resources to these social movements. This really has happened. But it is no longer like that. The resources crisis is big. The competition among NGOs is strong as well as between NGOs and movements' (Interview 4).

'NGOs gradually became the privileged representative of civic claims. This process described as the 'ngoization' of social movements³¹ has been accompanied by a strict identification between NGOs and 'civil society'. Consequently, the question of representation emerged as a central element in their own debate. In this discussion, an important element was the fact that, in order to legitimate themselves in their new role as state partners, NGOs still need to be representatives, to some extent, of the interests of subaltern social sectors. After all, the new role of NGOs was presented by the neo-liberal state as carrying 'the participation of civil society'.³²

Several views of this question emerged from the debate; most of them revealed important redefinitions of previous conceptions, especially with respect to the relationships with popular social movements. A first tendency was for NGOs to present themselves as political subjects in their own right, in a process of political autonomization very much linked to the interlocution with the state and the international development agencies'.

'(...) we began to see ourselves no longer almost as a "service counter", where popular movements come and say "I want information about this". We are not that. We are not a service counter, on the contrary, we are an actor, no better nor worse than any actor of other kind. We are not here disputing with trade unions this capacity of being an actor, nor with the parties, but as an organization composed of citizens, that sees itself as performing a public role, we have something to say. (...) Hence, we demand for the NGOs and other organizations of civil society a public role, a function - we are private organizations but with public ends' (Interview 5).

'NGOs are not representative from the point of view of the masses, but they are representative from the point of view of the legitimacy of what they defend' (Interview 4.)

'The intention to 'provide more structure' to the movements did not prevent conflicts with other sectors of the movement: 'they thought: 'with an office, computer, printer, fax, they came not to be only a reference but to finish with everything that is here'. But later they realized it was exactly the opposite; it was to change the status of the movement, everything was very precarious. Still, tensions remained, derived from the fact that the NGO was able to occupy spaces that the movement was unable to occupy' (Teixeira, 2003).

'Caught within these contradictions, different NGOs made different choices. Since the relationships with the state seemed to be the main factor in the changes affecting the relationships with popular social movements, the debate centred on these relationships. A few fully rejected any kind of relationship with the state: 'When ABONG [the Brazilian Association of NGOs] raises this discussion on [the participation of NGOs in] public policies, it sees these organizations as a state arm for the elaboration of policies. First, we don't see ourselves as an organ of the state. We are not, we won't be and when we become to be, we won't have any reason whatsoever to exist' (Interview 7).

In trying to accommodate different types of activities, others make clear distinctions between different kinds of relationships with different partners. For some, partners are the social movements and partnership means an egalitarian relationship based on shared values, tasks and resources (Interviews 4, 8 and Teixeira, 2003). Relationships with the state are then conceived of in other terms:

'What is a partnership with the state? In general, it is like this: we are doing something that the state should be doing. The previous language was much better: 'we receive a subsidy to implement a service that the state used to do; the state doesn't do it, at most, it gives a subsidy for us to do it.' That was the way we talked before. The SOF received money from the state, a little, from the Social Assistance Department, to provide a clinic service. This is not a partnership with the state, this is a contract (*convênio*); now, a partnership looks like the state is helping something that it is its duty to do' (Interview 8).

'The City administration of São Paulo, for instance, wants to qualify teachers in sexual education in the public schools. Is this a partnership? No. This is providing a service. (...) I am providing a service, you hire me, this is not a partnership' (Interview 9).

NGOs and others linked to the philanthropic tradition and to the entrepreneurial foundations that emerged in Brazil alongside the neo-liberal project, seem to feel comfortable with the situation. They do not see the need to establish criteria for actions involving partnerships:

'FEAC always tried to be apolitical because governments go and FEAC stays. We engage in partnerships every time we are asked to participate' (Interview 10).

Their views of the relationship with the state and their role in it are clear:

'FEAC does not want to perform the government's role but it wants to complement the actions of the government (...). We believe that the social problem of each city, the community itself must take care of it, asking for governmental action according to necessity and also to its obligation'.

This understanding of complementarity (or subsidiarity, another key word in the neo-liberal vocabulary) seems to clearly express the transfer of responsibilities from the state to civil society mentioned before. Other NGOs have defined this kind of civic action as 'depleting the public function of the state'. But the response is:

'You are right, education is an obligation of the state, but what happens is that the state did not assume this education yet. However, education is a factor of social change. The slower this education, the slower that change will be. Hence, we need to do the part that the state is not doing. (...) Education is a way to exert pressure so education exists, officially, in the public system' (Interview 11).

If the role of participants in a contractual market relationship as providers of services and goods is clearly distinguished in the previous group of NGOs, the group linked to entrepreneurial foundations does not see the need to distinguish itself from the market. For them, their intimate link with business firms:

'places us also in the market sector. Our identity is hybrid. The bottom line is: second or third sector, it doesn't matter'.

This conception of citizenship intends to offer an alternative understanding: 'our role is to depurify a little this concept, these jargons that are emerging (...)'. The same intention is explicit in the formulation of another connected NGO:

'We work deeply with citizenship. But not with that concept [that emphasizes rights], which is a little simplistic. The question of human rights is also ok, but I think that what is needed is to provide the individual with conditions to assume his or her role in society as a responsible element, not only a claiming role - 'I want all my rights' (Interview 13).

A member of another associated NGO, adds to this definition of citizenship:

'Our concern is with the insertion within the labour market, having conditions of developing themselves as citizens (...). Bringing awareness of each one's potential. But without any political direction. This is our concern: global development as a human being' (Interview 10).

In contrast with these conceptions of citizenship, defined by 'being a jobholder' and disconnected from political struggle and participation in the public sphere, a member of an NGO created during the dictatorship in defense of human rights points out:

'Human rights are there, entire chapters. For the first time our constitution has a whole chapter (...) Now, [the task] it is to demand that that is put in practice (...). That is why I think it is a citizenship growth: people are not begging for rights anymore. They begin to claim. He quotes a conservative Mayor of S. Paulo (1979-83) as telling him: 'What is happening with this people? They always come here to ask for; now they come with the petulance of claiming!' (Interview 14).

The second story is the story of new developments that add complexity and contradictions to what may seem simple and taken for granted: the very meaning of 'civic'. In examining the ideas of the now predominant actors in civil society, we found formulations that create a conflicting narrative, conveying the contradictory encounter between the participatory-democracy project and the advances of the neo-liberal project during the 1990s in Brazil. In the discourse of NGOs we find the diversity of elements that challenge the constitution of the

10 civic domain and of the directions taken by civic agency. As we have seen, many interests (and projects that express them) are intermingled within the mix of meanings attributed to the civic.

First, there are the institutional concerns of NGOs interested in their own survival as institutions and as autonomous political actors. Second are the interests of international cooperation to produce concrete measurable results through a 'qualified participation' of civil society. Third are governmental interests that sustain projects of shrinking its public responsibilities, while contemplating targeted groups of society and withdrawing from its role of guaranteeing rights to all citizens. Fourth, market interests are trying to profit from the withdrawing of the state, either by selling benefits formerly defined and ensured as rights or by engaging in pragmatic 'social responsibility'.

Original stories, as the one described in the first part of this article, are not easy to find today in Brazil. The 'saturation' by NGOs is not the only reason to explain this but it certainly has a crucial role, recognized by the NGOs themselves. The retreat of the Catholic Church that, through its progressive elements, provided a significant support to popular social movements in the 1980s, represented an important loss. Increasing violence and insecurity in the cities also play a role in worsening conditions for popular organization.

Other reasons, some of them more positive, can be found in the institutional channels opened up by the participatory spaces that, in spite of the enormous difficulties faced by most of them, receive demands from organized and non-organized popular sectors. They provide possibilities of public deliberation on rights, although less than more optimistic views are expected of them. Through these and other civil society initiatives, like forums, conferences and civil networks of all kinds, including an intense participation of NGOs, collective civic agency persists in finding ways to defend and reclaim conquered space.

The election of PT's Lula in 2002 raised expectations of significant advances toward the building of citizenship and the deepening of democracy along the lines defended by his party throughout its history. The years following the beginning of his first mandate in 2003 were times of waiting but also of continuous consolidation of neo-liberal practices within the 'civic domain'. Although the 'criminalization' of social movements was not reproduced in Lula's government, the prospects of expanding social participation in decision-making processes have not been realized. Federal programs to fight poverty such as 'Hunger Zero' and *Bolsa Família* have been successful and are said to be responsible for Lula's re-election in 2006. Nevertheless, their *assistentialist* character remains and their contribution to the reduction of poverty has not implied an increase in citizenship.

The Workers' Party (PT), which had served, since its foundation in 1980, as a broad framework for the organi-

zation of social movements and civic action, has increasingly withdrawn from this role and, now crisis ridden, has moved towards heavily emphasizing electoral success. Social movements connected to the party in some cases have been convinced that electoral victory should be a main objective of their political actions. However, thanks to its internal diversity, some sections of the party try to rescue its origins, proposing a 'refoundation' of the party. In many of the cities governed by the PT, local administrations remain committed to the participation of society and to ensuring public spaces for civic agency and organization. In spite of its more recent trajectory, the Workers' Party is still exceptional when compared to most other parties, historically deeply characterized by clientelist relations with the popular sectors. Hence, for social movements it is a difficult move to dismiss its role in popular mobilization and organization for more than 25 years.

Since a major part of civic-driven change in Brazil and in other countries in Latin America has political society (state and political parties) as central references, a crucial question is: can the state or political parties offer receptive scenarios for civic-driven change? Can they share 'civic' concerns? In what conditions and under which terms? Or will they inevitably constitute sources of repression, domination and subordination? The Brazilian contemporary scenario demonstrates the complexity of the question. Again, the heterogeneity and diversity of civil society applies to political society as well. In spite of the fact that specific structural roles shape political projects of states and political parties, sometimes in central ways, distinct political options can be made in different contexts. Those political options are ones which can answer, positively or negatively, the questions about the role of political society with respect to the civic.

The diversity and divergence of conceptions affecting directly the meanings attributed to civic agency shown in our stories are evident. Expressions such as 'petulance of claiming rights', 'qualified participation', 'depleting the public responsibility of the state', 'being responsible for executing public policies', being 'an arm of the state'; or a social movement's 'service counter'; or 'investing at the grassroots level', convey different definitions and beliefs. Efficiency conceived as 'results' or as 'process', citizenship conceived as 'insertion within the labour market' or 'the strengthening of the subjects', 'second or third sector, it doesn't matter', there are abundant examples of the presence of distinct political projects in dispute. They imply different and divergent representations of 'what life in society should be'. Consequently, they also point out different and divergent paths to achieve such ideals. That is to say, distinct conceptions of change are also at stake in this dispute. Recognizing the latter as a political dispute confronts any easy or simplistic view of what constitutes the civic, as either predetermined locations or assumed inherent virtues and attributes. In other words, conceptions of society and of the nature of change processes to achieve it are what define the meanings of civic agency.

The implications of such a conclusion seem clear:

political choices have to be made when considering civic agency and making decisions about where to deposit our hopes and energy. The pseudo unanimity of the perverse confluence and the opacity it creates impose first a rigorous analysis of what hides behind the divergent and often antagonistic uses of the 'civic' and its correlates. This shall constitute the basis for these political choices. Shall these choices contribute to reinforce the implantation of the logic of the market as the principle organizing social life? Shall they point towards the constitution of citizens as subjects able to determine the destiny of their collective life, sharing the power of decision over society's course? Shall they sustain the conception of a state no longer responsible to guarantee rights to all citizens? Shall they reinforce the correlate conception of participation of civil society directed towards assuming those public responsibilities? Shall they promote the constitution of civic agency as the ascension to the public sphere of all those excluded from it? These are only a few among many alternatives posed by the possibilities of what is today being referred to as civic agency in many parts of the world. What is at stake in the dispute between them is precisely what kind of world is ahead.

Notes

¹ The notion of political projects here refers to those beliefs, interests, desires and aspirations, worldviews and representations of what life in society should be, that guide the political action of different subjects. I argue that they are present, in very different degrees of elaboration and formalization, in any political action; therefore, they should not be confused with political parties' programs.

² Where the struggle to deepen and enlarge democracy has reached a significant degree of consolidation, perverse confluence today forms a 'mined field', where sectors of civil society, including NGOs not supportive of the neo-liberal project, feel deceived.

³ The powerful influence of Habermas is notorious here. These specific 'locations' or sites are to be distinguished through distinct modes of operation or of 'coordinating actions' and respective power resources: instrumental reason or purposive-rational action would characterize the 'systemic world' (which includes the state and the market, oriented respectively by power and profit), and communicative action or communicative forms of reason that would characterize the 'lifeworld'. There is a close connection between locations and characteristics (both virtuous and non-virtuous).

⁴ Fowler (2007).

⁵ This underlies an increasingly recurrent category in Brazil and other countries: the distinction between a *civil* and a *non-civil* society, referring, for instance, to drug trafficking and criminal organized groups for whom the physical elimination of others is seen as a current element of social life.

⁶ Obviously, 'equal rights' do not necessarily mean the 'same rights'; but all rights necessary to ensure equality among different citizens.

⁷ Differentiation and divergence may also be present in the definition of equality itself.

⁸ Foweraker (1995); Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar (1998).

⁹ For a discussion of the articulation between the right to equality and the right to difference, see Dagnino (1994).

¹⁰ For a detailed account of this redefinition, see Dagnino (1994, 2005b).

¹¹ In this sense, the category political society used in political science to designate the state and the political parties, as distinct from civil society, should be read as just an analytical specifying category and should not imply, in my view, a conception of civil society as a non-political terrain.

¹² The move here was not exactly 'a shift from equality of opportunity to 'equality of agency'', mentioned in Harry Boyte's essay, but rather a move towards recognizing that 'without agency there would be no opportunities'.

¹³ The concern of Brazilian social movements with the need to affirm a right to have rights is clearly related to extreme levels of poverty and exclusion but also to the pervasive *social authoritarianism* that presides the unequal and hierarchical organization of social relations as a whole. This cultural deprivation imposed by the absolute absence of rights - which ultimately expresses itself as a suppression of human dignity - constitutes material deprivation and political exclusion (Telles, 1994).

¹⁴ Dagnino (1994b).

¹⁵ The relationship popular movements establish with the state is quite complex and obviously context dependent, as will be seen later. As the state is obviously a fundamental institution in the recognition of rights, the struggle includes confrontation but also selective alliances and the search for support. Dona Marlene's memories are full of stories of confrontation, including physical ones, resonating with Shirin Rai's concerns about the risks of civic agency.

¹⁶ Durham (1984).

¹⁷ After the 1988 Constitution, the principle of participation of society both in the discussion and in decision-making processes concerning public matters inspired a significant emergence of participatory activity and spaces. The Constitution included mechanisms of direct and participatory democracy. Among them was the establishment of Management Councils (Conselhos Gestores) for public policy, with memberships equally divided between civil society and local, state, and federal governments.

¹⁸ For a more complete analysis, see Dagnino, Olvera and Panfichi (2006).

¹⁹ Oliveira (1997).

²⁰ Guerra (1997).

²¹ See Teixeira, 2003. The reform of the state that was implemented in Brazil in 1998 under the influence of Minister Bresser Pereira (who introduced the principles of 'New Public Management') is very clear in relation to the different roles of what is referred to as the 'strategic nucleus of the state' and of social organizations. The former retains a clear monopoly over decision-making (Bresser Pereira, 1996).

²² Dagnino (2004).

²³ García Canclini, (1996).

²⁴ The most common accusation made by governments and conservative media against social movements, such as the Landless Movement (*Movimento dos Sem Terra*) in Brazil, that they 'are political', is emblematic of this restrictive view of politics.

²⁵ Telles (2001).

²⁶ Sousa Santos (1999).

²⁷ Oliveira (1999).

²⁸ The interviews were conducted by Ana Cláudia Teixeira between 1997 and 1999, as part of a research project for her dissertation, published as *Identities in Construction: As Organizações Não Governamentais no Processo Brasileiro de Democratização*, S. Paulo: Annablume/Fapesp, 2003. I thank her for generously allowing me to use her data. Interviews are numbered and a list of the respective organizations can be found at the end of the article.

²⁹ Gibbs, Kuby and Fumo (1999:10).

³⁰ This 'excess of technique' echoes Boyte's *technocratic creep*, showing how technocratic approaches are stimulated and can predominate even among crucial 'civic agents' such as NGOs.

³¹ Alvarez (1999).

³² In addition, as a member of the government put it: "They are the ones who are inside the communities, they are the ones who know and no state or city agency has the capacity to substitute what the NGOs do locally (Interview with AIDS-related state agency member, Ministry of Health, conducted by Teixeira).

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Interview 1 - NOVA - PESQUISA E ASSESSORIA EM EDUCAÇÃO; Rio de Janeiro

Interview 2 - CAMP - Centro de Assessoria Multiprofissional; Porto Alegre

Interview 3 - FASE - FEDERAÇÃO DE ÓRGÃOS PARA ASSISTÊNCIA SOCIAL E EDUCACIONAL; Rio de Janeiro, (with regional offices).

Interview 4 - ANSUR - ASSOCIAÇÃO NACIONAL DO SOLO URBANO; S. Paulo

Interview 5 - IBASE - INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE ANÁLISES SOCIAIS E ECONÔMICAS; Rio de Janeiro

Interview 6 - Geledés - INSTITUTO DA MULHER NEGRA; São Paulo

Interview 7 - CPV - CENTRO DE DOCUMENTAÇÃO E PESQUISA VERGUEIRO; São Paulo

Interview 8 - SOF - SEMPREVIVA - ORGANIZAÇÃO FEMINISTA; São Paulo

Interview 9 - COLETIVO FEMINISTA SEXUALIDADE E SAÚDE; São Paulo

Interview 10 - FUNDAÇÃO FEAC - FEDERAÇÃO DAS ENTIDADES ASSISTENCIAIS DE CAMPINAS; Campinas, SP.

Interview 11 - ESPAÇO - FORMAÇÃO, ASSESSORIA E DOCUMENTAÇÃO; São Paulo

Interview 12 - GIFE - GRUPO DE INSTITUTOS, FUNDAÇÕES E EMPRESAS

Interview 13 - Instituto C&A DE DESENVOLVIMENTO SOCIAL

Interview 14 - Centro Santo Dias; S. Paulo.