Weak State Helps Extremism in Indonesia

Article by Pluralism Programme associate Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf, originally published on http://crcs.ugm.ac.id

What can the Indonesian state do to counter radicalization? The government does not have to  return to the past authoritarianism by banning radical organizations.  What matters more for a strong state is consistent law enforcement  against extreme activities. These include both physical activities such  as violence against minorities and non-physical activities such as  speeches or publications that fuel sectarian hatred.

The most welcomed aspect of Indonesia’s  democratization is probably political freedom. This is marked by the  flourishing social organizations that illustrate the resurgence of civil  society. However, strong society, although idealized, is not always  positive for a democracy. This is especially true in a state with a weak  government.

A distinguished political scientist,  Joel Migdal warned of  the risk of having a strong civil society in a state with government  lacking the ability to govern. A common consequence of weakened states  is that the government lacks political will, institutional authority and  organised power to provide basic functions of the state. If the state  is unable to fulfill these functions, a power void will result and may  lead to the rise of strong societies.

The critical point of this situation is  the fact that the void left by the state is exploited not only by  pro-democratic actors, but also by those with undemocratic and extreme  goals. The declining popularity of the current administration resulted  from its weak performance in producing prosperity and delivering justice  leads society to turn eyes to non-governmental actors, including those  with radical agenda. Weak state therefore has a part in easing the  mobilization of extremism.

 

Weak State, Radicalization and Terrorism

The increase of intolerance and  sectarian violence in recent years is a good example.  The success of  the police in arresting and dismembering the terrorist networks deserve  appreciation. However, the focus on those directly involved in terrorist  activities indicates the inability of the state to govern, and that  creates an environment favourable for radicalization. Whenever terrorist  strike, authorities were able to arrest the actors and discover the  network of the terrorist in a matter of days. But an environment  favourable for the regeneration or recruitment of terrorists is left  unaddressed despite demand from mainstream religious leaders. Thus,  terrorist organization is weakened, but the reproduction of terrorist  continues.

The importance of environment as an  indirect factor for extremism is evident in the background of terrorists  arrested or killed in recent years. Most of them had experience or  interaction with radical organizations. It may be misleading to suggest a  connection between terrorist and radical organizations. Such an  analysis misses the nuance and diversity among radical groups. However,  interaction between active terrorists and non-terrorist radical groups  provide an avenue for the recruitment or reproduction terrorists.

The profiles of the actors of the last  few terrorist attacks illustrate this tendency. The suicide bombers in  Cirebon and Solo, M. Syarif and Ahmad Yosepa had experience with  different radical organizations, as either a member or a participant.  Syarif took part in the activities of a local radical group named  Gerakan Anti Pemurtadan dan Aliran Sesat/Movement against Proselytising  and Illegal Sects (GAPAS); and Yosepa was once a member of Abu Bakar  Ba’asyir’s Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid.

Sometimes the interaction went beyond  personal level. Upon the opening of terrorist military training in Aceh  discovered by the police, many of the Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI)  members took part in initial trainings led by figures in the Jamaad  Islamiyah (JI). In this case, the purpose of FPI’s participation in the  Aceh training was different from the terrorist plan. They claimed that  the training was meant to train volunteers to fight against Israel in  Palestine. Such a battle is however not possible. What matters then was  the transfer of military skill and ideological exchange between the  terrorist and the non-terrorist radicals.

Using Moghaddam’s theory of staircase to  terrorism, movements fuelling sectarianism creates a  step toward an extreme attitude that supports, glorifies and eventually  justifies participation in terrorist activities. The non-lethal but no  less dangerous impact of unchecked radicalism is the creation of moral  panic in society that erodes multicultural attitude crucial for the  success of democracy.

Radicalization is made possible by the  weak response of the government. Sectarian rhetoric now spreads  unchecked. It is ironic that in country with a potential for identity  conflict inherent in an ethnically and religiously diverse country,  people are free to fuel sectarian hatred or animosity. Such an  incitement is not secret; they are publicly exposed on websites and  through sermons.

Radical groups often got away unpunished  after exercising coercive action against minority group, which should  be the sole authority of the state. Sometimes authorities bring the perpetrators of anti-minority violence to the court; but often they are  then bogged down to pressure by giving minor punishment. The sentence of  the perpetrators of an organized and cruel killing of the Ahmadiya  members in Cikeusik (West Java) to only 3 to 6 years would do nothing  but motivate similar action.

 

Responses, Law Enforcement

Surely, Indonesia’s strengthened society  is not only evident among those promoting undemocratic values, but also  those promoting harmony and tolerance. The void left by the weak state  has created a competition between mainstream religious groups and  minority intolerant movements.

What is encouraging about this is the  emergence of grass root resistance to radicalization. A recent example  is the rally of a number local Muslim organizations in Ponorogo (East  Java) opposing the operation of radio station run by a puritan group,  Majelis Taklim Al-Qur’an (MTA). The broadcasting of intolerant speeches  by the radio provoked anger among local Muslims that led them to demand  the end of the radio operation.  The targeting of the radio may indicate  the culmination of a long standing awareness among grass root Muslim of  the danger posed by often conflict provoking rhetoric of groups like  the MTA. This incident in Madiun is not the only case. Similar uproars  against MTA also occurred in Madiun (East Java) and Purworejo (Central  Java) where a local Muslim communities demanded the expulsion of an  allegedly “foreign priest” who promoted intolerant teachings.

Those grass root responses against  radicalization are refreshing when many organized counter-radicalism  efforts often breed backlash. Such a response however has to compete  with more organized and often more aggressive radicalization and  exploitation of political freedom, that the state seems to deliberately  neglect. As long as the state continues its weak stance, unable to  enforce law against religious militancy, radicalization will continue  erodes the country legendary multicultural society.

What can the state can do to strengthen  its position? A strong state is dissimilar to authoritarian state. The  government does not have to return to the past authoritarianism by  banning radical organizations. What matters more for a strong state is  consistent law enforcement against extreme activities. These include  both physical activities such as violence against minorities and  non-physical activities such as speeches or publications that fuel  sectarian hatred. This combined with strong democratic civil society  will give little room for radicalization and sectarianism.