Frequently Asked Questions
Frequently Asked Questions
By Stephan de Vries
Tags: West Asia , Civil Society in West Asia
1. Civil Society seems to be at the center of attention in this Knowledge Programme: what is understood by it?
Despite its presumed origin within Western political thinking, a clear and consensual definition of what civil society is does not exist. Following Biekart, ‘civil society in its modern conception primarily refers to citizenship and to a distinct ‘societal public sphere’ of social relations between the family and the state. Civil society can be defined as ‘the zone of voluntary associational life beyond family ties but separate from the state’, and can contain a wide variety of associations, such as advocacy NGOs, service oriented NGOs, labour unions, professional association, ethnic associations, student groups, cultural organisations (‘from choral societies to bird-watching clubs’), sporting clubs and informal community groups (including coffeehouses) (Carothers 1999). Civil Society, thus, is a sphere separate from the state, or in other words, in its most pure form it is independent from the state.
2. Democratization is a positive phenomenon? Rather clarify what is meant by it in the first place!
Rhetorically speaking, democratization can be described as the process of introducing democratic aspects within the functioning of a state. Democratization, however, cannot be defined by some fixed and timeless objective criterion because democracy itself is to be viewed as a contextually variable concept (Whitehead 2002). Following Whitehead, ‘democratization is best understood as a complex, long-term, dynamic and open-ended process. It consists of progress towards a more rule-based, more consensual and more participatory type of politics’ (ibid, italics author). Nevertheless, because it is so closely linked to ‘democracy’, it involves a combination of fact and value and therefore necessarily contains internal tensions (ibid). Thus, instead of defining democratization as an unambiguous and potentially rapid transition with a particular permanent end state, democratization, more appropriately, has to be seen as a lengthy process of social construction that is necessarily (but relatively) open-ended.
3. Looking for democratization? Turn to civil society!
Not so fast. True, traditionally the concept of civil society has always played a prominent role in explaining processes of democratization (Cavatorta 2009). The assumption is that a causal relation exists between both concepts. However, it has shown to be quite difficult to ‘prove’ that relation. The role civil society plays in processes of democratization is more complex than the straightforward notion of civil society being a driver of democratization. Carothers, for example, accentuates that there is some evidence that dangerous political weaknesses are reflected by a strong civil society. Proliferation of interests groups in developed democracies can make the workings of representative institutions impossible ‘and systematically distort policy outcomes in favor of the better organized’. At the same time, civil society may be strong enough while their aims are non-compatible with democratization; civil society in that case being of uncivil nature.
4. Fair enough, but regarding democratization, civil society is surely more important compared to political society, right?
Not necessarily. But before elaborating on this issue, lets take a look at the meaning of political society. ‘Political society is a separate sphere of actors and institutions mediating, articulating and institutionalizing the relations between the state and civil society. Political parties are the key institutions of political society. But when their function of mediation and articulation is performed or complemented by other organizations in civil society […] these could also (temporarily) be included in political society’ (Biekart 1999: 33). From this notion the conclusion follows that political society is ‘an intermediary sphere between the state and civil society’ (Biekart 1999).
Back to the question. Different notions hold both civil society and political society to be important stimuli for democratic transition. In other words, both civil and political society are able to stimulate democratization; isolated, simultaneous and interdependently (by complementing and strengthening each other). It should be kept in mind, however, that democratization is a fairly complex process and many intervening factors contribute to the outcome of that process. Civil and political society, thus, are both part of a multi-sided, context-dependable and complex model.
5. True or false: democratization in Islam-dominated settings is a contradictio in terminis.
False. One of the arguments sometimes heard is that Islam is non-compatible with democracy. Experiences in some Muslim-majority countries (like Albania, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Senegal and Turkey), however, proof this argument to be shaky. As Avineri states, ‘like other types of cultural stereotyping, it is misleading and wrong. Islam is intrinsically not different from any other religion when it comes to issues of democracy’ (Avineri 2010: 93). The statement that ‘Muslims, or Arabs, do not want or value democracy’ seems simplistic as well. Great shares of Arabs agree that ‘despite drawbacks, democracy is the best system of government’ and that ‘having a democratic system would be good for [their] country’ (Tessler & Gao 2005; Jamal & Tessler 2008; Diamond 2010). The same applies for (more) religious Muslims (Jamal & Tessler 2008). Many analysts, diplomats and donors even claim that Islam can be a positive mobilizing force for social justice, stability and democracy (Youngs 2008). Nevertheless, religion must be taken into the equation as a potential spoiler when people support both democracy and some kind of dogmatic religious (e.g. Islamic) governance. Although religion is a malleable concept (in a way it is what actors make of it), when it is interpreted in a dogmatic way it becomes a potential threat to democracy – like any other extreme ideology. When people very strongly hold on to the notion that God is sovereign, instead of the people, it becomes difficult, not to say impossible, to reconcile religion with democracy. More specific, notions in which it is believed that there is no ruler but God, instead of ‘there is no rule but God’s’, are not compatible with genuine democratic political systems. Such a notion becomes a threat to democracy in yet another way. Democrats may back non-democratic regimes when they fear that democratization will be ‘hijacked’ by religious fundamentalists. In the face of a ‘one person, one vote, one time’ construction they rather choose the non-democratic alternative. All in all, although not decisive on its own, religion seems to be a factor that should be taken into account when analyzing democratization prospects of countries.
6. Is outside support essential in order for democratization to happen?
Not necessarily. When configurations of global politics (e.g. relations, interests etc.) allow democratization to take place, the democratization of a state becomes (perhaps decisively) influenced by ‘the actions of governments and institutions external to that country’ (Huntington 1991). In fact, it is very well possible to identify historical periods in which the international context has been highly important (Pridham 2008). Nevertheless, in order to be lasting, the initial moves toward democracy, together with the desire for it, have to come from within. Outside support, when it is low scale and sincere, might prove to be useful, although often indirect and marginal (McFaul 2007).
7. Hybrid regimes: intellectual cul-de sac or useful subtype?
Hybrid regimes take the form of electoral democracy by pursuing some sort of window-dressing policy, however, fail to pass the actual test (Diamond 2002; Albrecht & Schlumberger 2004). One of the strategies used by such regimes is ‘co-optation’: ‘the elements of plural society are then encapsulated by the regime without being forced to give up their independent identities. […] As a result, political parties, individuals, businessmen and civil society officially remain independent but de facto become, to a varying extent, dependent on and beneficiaries of the regime’ (NIMD & Hivos 2010).
Although it was formerly believed that hybrid regimes were to be regarded as being in a phase on route to democratization, some scholars draw the conclusion that actually that is not (per se) the case (Schedler 2002; Levitsky & Way 2002). Diamond, for example, states that ‘for some years now, it has been apparent that a great many of the new regimes are not themselves democratic, or any longer “in transition” to democracy’ (Diamond 2002).
Although not shockingly different from ‘regular’ authoritarian regimes, the existing differences are not fictitious. Hybrid regimes are a product of the contemporary world and therefore different when compared to ‘classic’ authoritarian regime-types. Especially in the Middle East the phenomenon is highly relevant and therefore the attention paid to it seems reasonable. Apart from that, divergent forms of authoritarianism do matter. Quoting Diamond: ‘As democracies differ among themselves in significant ways and degrees, so do contemporary authoritarian regimes, and if we are to understand the contemporary dynamics, causes, limits, and possibilities of regime change (including possible future democratization), we must understand the different, and in some respects new, types of authoritarian rule’ (Diamond 2002: 33). All in all hybrid regimes are not regarded as an intellectual cul-de sac or residual category, but as an independent concept within this knowledge programme.
8. GONGOs are the new NGOs.
Although ‘new’, GONGOs should not be mixed up with NGOs. GONGOs are, confusingly enough, government-organized nongovernmental organizations. Following Moisés Naím, ‘behind this contradictory and almost laughable tongue twister lies an important and growing global trend that deserves more scrutiny: Governments are funding and controlling nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), often stealthily. They have become the tool of choice for undemocratic governments to manage their domestic politics while appearing democratic’ (Naím 2007). The appearance of GONGOs, as a counterweight to independent civil society actors, thus, is more or less part of ‘authoritarian upgrading’: adapting by re-organizing strategies of governance to adjust to new global, regional, and domestic circumstances.
As can be concluded from all this, GONGOs are mostly known to be used as ‘lightning conductors’ in order to obstruct internal and/or external efforts for democratization. Nevertheless, we should not totally exclude the possibility that GONGOs work as a driver of democratization. Even if not used as such primarily, GONGOs may eventually create openings for democratization.
9. Can you become rich from social capital?
In fact, you can! However, as the concept implicates, more in a social than a material sense. Although social capital, in short being connections within and between social networks, in the abstract is a neutral resource (Coleman 1988), the concept is widely seen as a driver of ‘civic engagement’ and even democratization. As a matter of fact, Putnam (1995) claims that social capital is a key component to building and maintaining democracy. ‘The notion of social capital has gained enthusiastic support from nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental confederations, and supranational bodies such as the European Union, the World Bank, and the United Nations. [Following Putnam,] they all believe that social capital might be a potent aid for democratization, for repairing defective democracies, and for undermining authoritarian regimes. Following this notions, those who believe in democracy may very well become rich from social capital.
However, there is the other side of the coin, which proves prospects for democratization less rosy when depending on social capital. Roßteutscher (2010), for example, claims that ‘social capital functions as a stabilizer of authoritarian rule. Its effects are mainly negative. Social trust, in particular, might be a “key resource for the market economy and democratic politics” (Stolle, 2003, p. 19). In nondemocratic contexts, however, it appears to throw a spanner in the works of democratization. Social participation and trust, specifically, increase the stability of nondemocratic leadership by generating popular support, by suppressing regime-threatening forms of protest activity, and by nourishing undemocratic ideals of governance (Roßteutscher 2010).
10. Is green still the color of hope in Iran?
Only in part. Although many sceptical views exist on this issue, it indeed is the color of hope for many people in and outside of Iran. Although rooted in Iran’s democratic moments of history, the Green Movement came into existence after the disputed presidential elections of 2009. Entering the streets and opposing the election outcome, the movement proved the opposition, together with civil society, to be capable of mobilizing and claiming its share in Iranian decision-making. Considering the large amounts of security forces on the street on June 12th 2010, the anniversary of the 2009 disputed elections, those protests have made the regime nervous and alert. Nevertheless, it remains doubtful whether civil society is truly independent from the state and whether the Green Movement actually is a coherent ‘powerblock’ that is able to weaken the stability of the regime to a great extent. Most of the ‘Greens’ are middle-class urbanites, or technocrats so to say, where the hardliners’ backers ‘are less-educated political loyalists’ (Maljoo 2010). The Green Movement, thus, is founded on a narrow social basis and one should be hesitant to expect the working class to join hands with the Greens any time soon (ibid). All in all, the status of the Green Movement as a beacon for hope remains disputed. On the one hand, the impotence of the movement to claim the streets, and more important public opinion making, seems to have silenced the movement for the time being. However, as Hooman Majd explains, ‘what is evident is that if we consider Iran's pro-democracy "green movement" not as a revolution but as a civil rights movement -- as the leaders of the movement do -- then a "win" must be measured over time. The movement's aim is not for a sudden and complete overthrow of Iran's political system. It augurs well for eventual democratic reform in Iran that the green movement continues to exist at all. Despite all efforts by the authorities to portray it as a dangerous counterrevolution, the green movement continues to attract supporters and sympathizers from even the clergy and conservative Iranians’ (Majd 2010). Maybe green is still the color of hope in Iran because, at least for now, for reformist-minded people the Green Movement is as good as it gets.
11. Will new media proof to be the ultimate weapon regarding the fight for democratization?
Don’t bet on it. Some academics argue that there is no necessary causal relation between the advent of new media and political liberalization (see for example Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas 2003) and that new media has often be used in ways that help consolidate the power of authoritarian states. However, although maybe not as the ultimate weapon, new media can influence prospects for democratization, or at least liberalization, can open new spheres of political mobilization and projects of inclusion as they create new public actors: media producers and media consumers. Civil society activists and political dissidents around the world continue to view the internet as an important tool in their resistance against oppressive regimes and argue that it is often their only available medium to connect to the society. These activists believe firmly in the supposedly democratizing effect of the internet. The internet, with websites like Facebook, Twitter and MSN messenger, can be seen as a new register where power relations between the regime and its opponents are negotiated, it can be used as an educational tool, and it can be used to ‘propose’ new state/society relations.
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