Iran: An (almost) revolutionary situation

Tags: West Asia , Civil Society in West Asia

The post-election revolt of June 12 in Iran created a `revolutionary’ potential for confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). Almost all authoritarian electoral regimes ultimately produce several crises, like the lack of elite cohesion, crisis of ideological legitimacy, and inability to manage and control the country’s affairs.

The power structures of the IRI have always been characterized by factionalism, but the recent developments showed that contradictions and differences between different fractions reached a tipping point. This elite disunity has not been solved successfully by arbitration, as during the rule of Ayatollah Khomeini, but has been met with violence and repression. Moreover, there is no longer any possibility to make a consensus based on `general interests’ between competitive factions within the power block, as has frequently occurred in the last two decades, after the death of the charismatic leadership of Khomeini. As a result, the conflict and contradiction within the ruling elite and their social supporters intensified the regime’s instability.

In addition to the lack of unity and political elite cohesion, the IRI also faces a legitimacy crisis. The chronic crisis of legitimacy under the IRI had been caused by a number of factors and developments. (1) In the last two decennia a type of secular/liberal oriented interpretation of political Islam was developed by a segment of the dominant political elite - i.e. Abdul Karim Soroush, Ayatollah Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, Mohsen Kadivar and Hasan Yousefi-Eshkevari, which has undermined the orthodox ideology of the ruling elite. (2) The Constitution of the `Islamic’ `Republic’ has got a contradictory nature, in terms of seeking to combine theocratic and democratic dimensions of the legitimacy of the system. (3) The gap is increasing between the ideology of the Islamic regime on the one hand and the demands of the peoples in urban areas - mainly the youth, women, minorities, and students - as a result of the failure of Islamization of society’s norms and values by the regime. Iranians today appear to be less religious in comparison to the public of other Muslim countries, and the trend in their value orientations is towards individual freedom, civil rights, gender equality, democracy, and national identity. (4) One of the main political characteristics of the IRI is its chronic administrative inefficiency to manage the country’s affairs. This phenomenon intensified during Ahmadinejad’s presidency. It is characterized by failure of his populist political economy, which manifested itself in inflation, recession and increasing unemployment. State capacity for effective action requires elite cohesion and widespread diffuse support for the regime in society. In the situation where there is no elite cohesion and unity of the leadership, the economic crisis is not solved, leading to instability in society. This opens the possibility of political mobilization by oppositional forces.

The post-election protest movements in Iran were primarily caused by demands the new government was unwilling to meet, or even hear, an inconsistency between the increasing political demand of the people and the result of the election. When the main political factions, the fundamentalist faction and the conservative/pragmatic faction - Khamenei-Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani - publically manifested their differences, it created an opening for action from below. A feeling of expectation for the people that the conservative/pragmatic elements should accept the demands of the so-called Green Movement.

The flip side: strong pillars supporting the authoritarian Islamic regime

The ruling political class has so far managed to suppress the movement, this means the main pillars of the authoritarian regime are, to ar large extend, still in place. The ruling faction of the political elite rests on two pillars of power: the repressive apparatus and the oil and gas industries. These two pillars form the main pillars of the regime at the moment and are inseparable. State revenues from oil and gas exports create possibilities for the dominant faction to finance the repressive apparatus in order to suppress oppositional forces and maintain order. The revenues are exchanged for support and furthermore administered to buy political loyalty and obedience. In this way, oil and gas revenues enable the regime to persist. It can distribute oil revenue in combination with repression to essentially pacify the majority of the Iranian populace. By state-controlled religious foundations (Bonyads), Islamic associations (Anjoman-e Islami), and military- (Sepah Pasdaran) and para-military institutions (Basij), the regime is able to control and mobilize people from above. Additionally, the `revolutionary’ Islamic ideology, redistribution of wealth and prestige projects like the nuclear programme have, still now, enabled the regime to continue mobilizing support of segments of the population. Finally, the Islamic regime has got relatively powerful international allies - China and Russia in particular- which provide it with diplomatic, military and economic support.

The private sector, parallel and autonomous of the government, therefore, is not strong enough to build up formidable economic power and organizational and financial strength of its own, for it to defect from an allegiance with the autocratic regime. However, it is (only) at that point that democratization efforts are likely to advance exponentially.

Although dissatisfaction is necessary for social protest and change, it is not sufficient. Political transformation depends on program/strategy, leadership, organization, and mobilization. The Green Movement in Iran does not have a clear and coherent program and strategy. It consists of several interest groups with different ideas and demands for political change and eventually democracy and democratization. The moderate wing (the main leadership) within the Green Movement, are those who believe that democratization in current Iran is only possible in the context of the existing Islamic Constitution. Its leaders inside Iran, Mir Hussein Mousavi, Mehdi Karoubi and Mohammad Khatami, have continuously emphasized their loyalty to the constitution and the legacies of the Islamic revolution. The current constitution of the Islamic regime is the main impediment for democracy and democratization in Iran.

But the question is how the reformist movement is able to reform the system, and at the same time protect the constitution and legacies of the IRI of the last three decades. Is it truly a reform movement or is the movement actually striving for preservation of the system and the corresponding constitution, with its fundamental contradictions? If leaders of the current movement are loyal to the public demands for democratic transition in Iran, they have no choice but to distance themselves from the current political system and the legacies of the revolution. The current demands of the civil society and the people are far more radical than the demands of the major segment of leaders of the Green Movement. To the Iranian people, the reformist movement should be dedicated to gradual democratization and democracy. Among the people, there’s a wish to initiate some kind of ‘velvet’ revolution, something the leadership of the movement resists. There is thus a strong division between the leadership of the movement and the people on the street.

Conclusions and prospects

The main causes of the current social revolt in Iran are indeed very similar to the classical ones: the breakdown of a modernizing autocracy torn by internal contradictions, caused by various processes of socio-economic development/modernization, which gave rise to many new modernized economic and professional classes, that were denied any autonomous access to the political centre.

To conclude, a revolutionary change is not probable, as the current movement is defensive of nature rather than offensive and in the short term probably won’t transform into an offensive movement either. However, the current system is not sustainable either, as result of its fundamental contradictions, the lack of elite cohesion, and the nationwide social protests. Based on the current situation, the following scenarios are possible:

• The first scenario envisages that social unrest continues to exist, protest re-emerges and is violently suppressed by the current regime. In this scenario, the centralized power structure and militarization of the regime intensifies.
• In the second scenario, reforms are incrementally implemented by the regime in the form of a ‘velvet revolution’. This scenario can only succeed if the constitution is altered in such a way that the principle of velayat-e faqih is discarded.
• The third scenario is a radical change from below; a new social revolution. This is only possible if the current mass movement can create an alternative appealing ideology and an organization (for example a broad coalition/front of different political ideas, organizations and ideologies) with strong leadership able to challenge the changing repressive Islamic authoritarian regime with a democratic one.

This article is a contribution by Knowledge Programme Civil Society in West Asia.